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BEYOND THE PIPELINE WARS: REFORMING ENVIRONMENTAL 
ASSESSMENT OF ENERGY TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
James W. Coleman* 
 
Abstract 
In recent years, the role of transport infrastructure in energy markets 
has become a flashpoint for legal conflict. On one hand, the world is ex-
periencing an unprecedented buildout of all kinds of energy transport: oil 
and gas pipelines, liquefied natural gas projects, power transmission, and 
port facilities for coal and oil. On the other hand, environmental advocates 
have increasingly insisted that pipelines and other transport projects 
should not be built if they would encourage fossil fuel production in mar-
kets “upstream” and fossil fuel consumption in markets “downstream” of 
these projects.  
Governments have struggled with how to respond. President Obama 
famously promised to assess the upstream emissions from the Keystone XL 
pipeline but the resulting analysis was criticized by all sides as confusing 
and incomplete. In the meantime, most other energy transport facilities, 
including other oil and gas pipelines, were being approved without any 
upstream or downstream analysis over the objection of environmental 
groups. The federal agencies have split between infrastructure approving 
agencies which are resisting wider reviews and the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, which has demanded them. And the fight has spread to 
other countries, where the Keystone XL precedent is now frequently cited 
as a model by opponents of oil and gas pipelines. 
This Article makes the counterintuitive case that studying how energy 
transport projects might affect upstream and downstream markets is un-
wise. First, the marginal impact of a single energy transport project in 
ever changing global energy markets is so uncertain that it provides no 
useful information to the agencies that decide on these projects. Second, 
to approve or reject a pipeline because it could encourage international 
energy markets is to assert the power and the authority to control energy 
markets in other countries—an undiplomatic encroachment on the author-
ity of those countries to balance environmental and economic concerns in 
regulating their own energy markets. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION: THE PIPELINE WARS 
 
In March 2008, near the end of President George W. Bush’s second term, the 
United States Department of State issued a presidential permit for a new pipeline 
that would ship oil from Alberta to Illinois: the Keystone Pipeline. It was a relatively 
obscure decision—at the time, new pipelines were considered perhaps the most bor-
ing part of the energy industry.1 Nevertheless, it attracted a lawsuit. The Natural 
Resources Defense Council sued in the United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia, arguing that the State Department had improperly failed to provide an 
environmental review of the way that the pipeline would encourage oil use in the 
United States and oil production in Western Canada.2  
The State Department’s response to this allegation was simple—it had not con-
sidered how the pipeline might lead to increased oil production in Canada because 
its review was necessarily “limited to the pipeline which is a transportation system.”3 
The State Department would not speculate on how the pipeline would impact global 
energy markets: how it could increase oil production in the “upstream” areas that 
would supply the pipeline, or how it could increase oil refining and fuel consumption 
in the “downstream” areas served by the pipeline.4 And the State Department noted 
that it would be especially inappropriate to consider upstream oil production in Can-
ada because that production is “properly the subject of review by appropriate Cana-
dian governmental entities.”5  
                                                   
1 See Lauren Krugel, What the Keystone Decision Will Mean for Your Portfolio, GLOBE 
& MAIL (Mar. 28, 2013), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-investor/investment-
ideas/what-the-keystone-decision-will-mean-for-your-portfolio/article10491680/?service= 
print [https://perma.cc/H5J3-63LJ] (“Once upon a time pipeline companies were viewed as 
rather boring investments.”). 
2 See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 658 F. Supp. 2d 105, 109 (D.D.C. 
2009); First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 10, Nat. Res. Def, 
Council v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 658 F. Supp. 2d 105 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 1:08-cv-01363) 
(“Refining oil transported by the Pipeline can be expected to produce more greenhouse 
gases” and encourage “development of Canadian tar sands, which results in increased emis-
sions of greenhouse gases.”). 
3 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, SCOPING SUMMARY FOR THE KEYSTONE PIPELINE PROJECT EN-
VIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 52 (2006), https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/08/ 
f25/EIS-0410-FEIS-2008-Appendices_A-C.pdf [https://perma.cc/55ED-VNVH] (“The 
[Draft Environmental Impact Statement] addresses the reasonably foreseeable environmen-
tal impacts of the construction and operation of the proposed Keystone Pipeline within the 
United States and is limited to the pipeline which is a transportation system. The scope of 
the [Environmental Impact Statement] is necessarily limited to the scope of the proposed 
project and does not extend to the supply of crude oil to the transportation system or the 
operation of refineries that are supplied by it.”). 
4 Id. 
5 Id. (“Further, as provided in Executive Order 12114, ‘Environmental Effects Abroad 
of Major Federal Actions,’ Jan. 4, 1979, a federal agency is directed to consider extra-terri-
torial environmental impacts only in limited circumstances not applicable here.”). 
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In three sentences, the State Department made its position plain: when it re-
viewed the environmental impact of the pipeline, it would focus on the pipeline it-
self, on land disturbance, on community impacts, and on the danger of leaks or 
spills.6 It would not try to predict how the pipeline would affect larger energy mar-
kets, particularly foreign markets supervised by other countries’ regulators.7 Presi-
dent Obama’s State Department stuck by this decision and successfully defended it 
in court, convincing the D.C. District Court that the pipeline approval was unreview-
able—a determination that the plaintiffs did not appeal.8 In these few words, the 
State Department laid out one side of a debate that, in the following years, would 
become a focus of policy debates, interagency arguments, trade disputes, protests, 
and political campaigns across North America. 
In September 2008, six months after the original Keystone pipeline received its 
permit, the same company, TransCanada, filed an application for another pipeline.9 
The new pipeline’s proposed name, Keystone XL, reflects the time—a time when 
the last thing that a pipeline company worried about was attracting attention.10  
Just one month later, the Natural Resources Defense Council filed its suit 
against the original Keystone Pipeline approval.11 The central contention of this law-
suit was that the federal government should have considered how the pipeline would 
increase oil production in Canada.12 Though its arguments in that case would be 
rejected by both the Obama administration and the court, they sparked a global 
                                                   
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Nat. Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 658 F. Supp. 2d 105, 109, 111 (D.D.C. 
2009) (“[T]o challenge the issuance of a presidential permit, whether by the President him-
self or by the State Department as the President’s delegee, is to challenge a presidential act, 
which is not reviewable under the [Administrative Procedure Act].”). 
9 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, RECORD OF DECISION AND NATIONAL INTEREST DETERMINA-
TION 8 (2015), http://www.energylawprof.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Key-
stoneXL.Record-of-Decision.pdf [https://perma.cc/92TK-RUUW] (“Keystone’s first appli-
cation for the Keystone XL pipeline was submitted to the Deparment [of State] on September 
19, 2008.”). 
10 Modern oil and gas pipeline proposal names, rather than emphasizing their size or 
capacity to carry oil and gas, which could attract environmental scrutiny, generally empha-
size energy, opening up new markets, or unrelated concepts. In these respective categories, 
recent proposals include the Energy East and Northeast Energy Direct pipelines, the North-
ern Gateway and Dakota Access pipelines, and the Sandpiper and Constitution pipelines. 
Amy Harder, Protests Slow Pipeline Projects Across U.S., Canada, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 9, 
2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/protests-slow-pipeline-projects-across-u-s-canada-
1418173235 [https://perma.cc/4247-M2J6] (listing oil and gas pipeline proposals that have 
attracted significant opposition). 
11 Nat. Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 658 F. Supp. 2d 105, 109 (D.D.C. 
2009); First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injuctive Relief at 10, Nat. Res. Def. 
Council v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 658 F. Supp. 2d 105 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 1:08-cv-01363). 
12 First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injuctive Relief at 10, Nat. Res. Def. 
Council v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 658 F. Supp. 2d 105 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 1:08-cv-01363). 
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movement that would eventually lead President Obama to reverse course—first flip-
ping his position on the relevance of foreign emissions, then rejecting the Keystone 
XL proposal, and finally scrambling the rules of environmental review for energy 
infrastructure. President Obama would declare that, far from being irrelevant, the 
impact of the Keystone XL pipeline on Canadian oil production should be a central 
part of the State Department’s analysis: if the pipeline would increase greenhouse 
gas emissions from oil production, he would reject it.13  
But even that seemingly clear standard proved deceptive: in the end, the State 
Department concluded that approving Keystone XL would not increase emissions 
from oil production but rejected it anyway.14 The State Department reached this con-
clusion in 2015 after a seven year review that found the pipeline might even lower 
emissions because, without it, the oil would just be transported by trains that emit 
more greenhouse gases than pipelines.15 Nevertheless, the State Department decided 
that the pipeline should be rejected because, contrary to its own analysis, the pipeline 
would be “perceived as enabling further [greenhouse gas] emissions globally.”16 
Despite the delays and contradictions surrounding the State Department’s re-
jection of Keystone XL, an increasingly powerful global movement is taking it as a 
model, looking to expand it to all state and federal environmental assessments and 
to export this Keystone XL precedent to other projects and countries. Some of these 
cases, such as the Dakota Access Pipeline, have attracted widespread and sustained 
attention. But the movement is much broader, raising challenges to a wide range of 
                                                   
13 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Climate Change (June 25, 
2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/25/remarks-president-climate-
change [http://perma.cc/YZ38-GT3Y] (stating that Keystone XL would not be approved if it 
would “significantly exacerbate the problem of carbon pollution.”). 
14 Although American news stories occasionally suggest that there may no longer be a 
market to support Keystone XL because of lower oil prices and alternative modes of 
transport, continued growth in oil sands production means there will likely be an economic 
need for the pipeline for decades to come. See Art Berman, Keystone Pipeline Is a Risky Bet 
On Higher Oil Prices, FORBES (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/arthurber-
man/2017/02/03/the-keystone-xl-pipeline-a-risky-bet-on-higher-oil-prices-and-tight-oil/ 
[https://perma.cc/4K7K-KFVM]; Max Fawcett, Why Do We Need Keystone XL Anyway?, 
GLOBE & MAIL (Jan. 24, 2017),  https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rob-
magazine/pipelines-to-billions/article33703463/ [http://perma.cc/G687-KPT8]; Dan Heal-
ing, Alberta Oilsands Production Outlook Bright Despite Gloomy Headlines, CBC NEWS 
(Mar. 19, 2017), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/alberta-oilsands-production-
bright-outlook-1.4031788 [http://perma.cc/TN64-DSV8]. 
15 BUREAU OF OCEANS & INT’L. ENVTL. & SCI. AFFAIRS,  U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FINAL 
SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE KEYSTONE XL PROJECT: 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ES-34 (2014), https://keystonepipeline-xl.state.gov/documents/or-
ganization/221135.pdf [https://perma.cc/DR3T-KH87] (estimating that rejecting the pipe-
line lead to higher greenhouse gas emissions than approving it because all the oil would be 
transported by rail, which requires “28 to 42 percent” more greenhouse gas emissions than 
pipeline transport). 
16 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 9, at 29. 
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energy transport projects across the nation: gas pipelines, coal export terminals, and 
liquefied natural gas facilities.  
Scholars and environmental organizations argue that, from this point forward, 
all state and federal environmental reviews of new fossil fuel transport projects must 
consider whether they could increase fuel production upstream of the project or in-
crease fuel consumption downstream of the project.17 This expanded environmental 
assessment is often known as a “climate test” because it aims to determine whether 
pipelines will harm the climate by encouraging fossil fuel use.18 And sometimes it 
is simply called “Keystone-ization”19 or “the Keystone effect”20 on energy transport 
approvals.  
Regardless of its title, politicians and campaigners that are focused on climate 
change hope to export this expanded form of environmental assessment, foiling fos-
sil fuel transport projects across the globe.21 This aim has a certain plausibility—
                                                   
17 Michael Burger & Jessica Wentz, Downstream and Upstream Greenhouse Gas Emis-
sions: The Proper Scope of NEPA Review, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 109, 111 (2017); Ken 
Ilgunas, What Obama’s Rejection of Keystone Means for the Climate Fight, TIME (Dec. 1, 
2015), http://time.com/4130621/paris-climate-conference-keystone/ [https://perma.cc/KP8 
N-ZHHG] (“[T]he fight over [Keystone XL] has started a new trend in pipeline opposition. 
What were once normal and never-before-questioned conveyances of energy are now facing 
unprecedented levels of scrutiny, ire and resistance.”). 
18 Jeff Tollefson, Climate Science: A Line in the Sands, NATURE (Aug. 7, 2013), 
http://www.nature.com/news/climate-science-a-line-in-the-sands-1.13515 [https://perma.cc 
/BJ5Y-9356] (quoting the Natural Resource Defense Council’s Susan Casey-Lefkowitz’s 
statement that because increasing production necessarily increases emissions, she says, Key-
stone “fails the president’s climate test”). 
19 Bill Loveless, U.S. Natural Gas Projects Face Keystone-like Resistance, USA TO-
DAY (May 17, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2015/05/17/loveless-
dominion-natural-gas-keystone/27401527/ [https://perma.cc/TW7F-JBLL] (quoting Amer-
ica’s Natural Gas Alliance President Marty Durbin: “[W]e’ve seen a change in the de-
bate . . . call it the Keystone-ization of every pipeline project that’s out there, that if you can 
stop one permit, you can stop the development of fossil fuels.”); see also Zahra Hirji, It’s 
Not Just Dakota Access. Many Other Fossil Fuel Projects Delayed or Canceled, Too, INSIDE 
CLIMATE NEWS (Dec. 5, 2016), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/06052016/fossil-fuel-
projects-cancellations-keystone-xl-pipeline-oil-coal-natural-gas-climate-change-activists 
[https://perma.cc/EF6V-T3L5] (cataloguing projects killed by environmental reviews, in-
cluding Keystone XL and the Dakota Access pipeline). 
20 Elana Schor, Could Keystone Be America’s Last Pipeline?, POLITICO MAGAZINE 
(Jan. 10, 2015), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/01/keystone-be-americas-
last-pipeline-114137 [https://perma.cc/U27K-GX7X] (describing how “the Keystone effect” 
could block pipelines in the United States and Canada). This terminology is ironic, because 
the Keystone XL process was the exact reverse of the process used for the original Keystone 
pipeline. 
21 See, e.g., Clare Demerse, We Should Assess New Pipelines Like the Americans Do, 
GLOBE & MAIL (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/we-should-as-
sess-new-pipelines-like-the-americans-do/article17077926/ [https://perma.cc/4EJT-VUN7] 
(arguing that pipeline review should “consider not just the impact of the pipeline itself, but 
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after all, the United States’ principal environmental assessment law, the National 
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”)22 has long been the driving force behind envi-
ronmental assessment laws across the world, earning its reputation as “the nation’s 
most successful international export in the field of environmental protection law.”23 
As a result, the Keystone XL precedent is an increasing risk factor for all companies 
participating in global energy markets. 
Yet despite the global focus on the Keystone XL precedent, it remains totally 
unclear what, if any, rule it establishes for future environmental assessments in the 
United States. No company can predict how the United States will now review its 
energy transport proposals—the government has taken various inconsistent and con-
flicting approaches, often on the same project. It is not clear whether the government 
will review the impact of a transport project on upstream markets or downstream 
markets, or neither, or both. It is not clear how the government can estimate these 
impacts—a difficulty all too manifest in the review of the Keystone XL project. And 
even if the government could find reliable ways to estimate the effect of transport 
projects on global energy markets, it is not clear how the government would use 
these estimates to make a decision.  
The federal agencies are just as divided as the public on the propriety of a “cli-
mate test” for energy transport projects. The Environmental Protection Agency 
(“EPA”) has favored expanded environmental review.24 And to this point, scholars 
have largely agreed.25 Meanwhile, the agencies actually responsible for approving 
                                                   
also the impact of the product that flows through it” following the example of “President 
Barack Obama [who] has committed to make his decision on TransCanada’s Keystone XL 
pipeline project based on its impact on the climate.”). 
22 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–47 (2012). 
23 Richard Lazarus, The National Environmental Policy Act in the U.S. Supreme Court: 
A Reappraisal and a Peek Behind the Curtains, 100 GEO. L. J. 1507, 1510 (2012) (“As many 
as half of the states have . . . enacted their own NEPA programs modeled upon the federal 
statute. And approximately 160 other countries have done the same, making NEPA the na-
tion’s most successful international export in the field of environmental protection law.”); 
see also id. at 1520–21, 1520 n.75 (describing the complexities in counting how many states 
and countries have comparable environmental assessment laws and noting that some of these 
state and foreign laws are more stringent and wide ranging than NEPA); Bradley C. Kark-
kainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government’s Environmental 
Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 905 (2002) (“Whatever its faults, real or imagined, 
NEPA is without question the most widely emulated of the major U.S. environmental 
laws.”). 
24 See infra text accompanying notes 63–64. 
25 See, e.g., Aaron Flyer, FERC Compliance Under NEPA: FERC’s Obligation to Fully 
Evaluate Upstream and Downstream Environmental Impacts Associated with Siting Natural 
Gas Pipelines and Liquefied Natural Gas Terminals, 27 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 301, 304 
(2015) (“NEPA review must consider the impacts of increased natural gas use above and 
beyond the physical impacts of a specific pipeline or terminal.”); Amy L. Stein, Climate 
Change Under NEPA: Avoiding Cursory Consideration of Greenhouse Gases, 81 U. COLO. 
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infrastructure, such as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) and 
the Army Corps of Engineers have generally opposed such broader reviews.26  
This uncertainty could not come at a worse moment: the world energy system 
is currently in the midst of three transitions that are creating an unprecedented de-
mand for new and reliable energy transport infrastructure. First, a transition from 
conventional to unconventional sources of crude oil and natural gas is combining 
with developing world growth to scramble established oil and gas trade routes, lead-
ing to a new buildout of pipelines and port facilities designed to bring oil and gas 
from new production sources in North America to growing demand centers in Asia.27 
Second, to reduce fossil fuel use and move to renewable power, the United States 
will need to rapidly build power transmission from the deserts and prairies where 
solar power and wind power are often sited to the metropolitan centers of electricity 
demand.28 Third, to reduce the use of coal and support the transition to renewable 
power, the United States will need a massive build out of pipelines to transport nat-
ural gas to power plants that can replace coal and ramp up and down to accommodate 
the variable output of solar and wind.29 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II considers the existing law on envi-
ronmental assessments: court decisions under the National Environmental Policy 
Act and the Council on Environmental Quality’s sparse guidance on assessing 
greenhouse gas emissions related to federal actions. It shows that neither source pro-
vides a clear answer on whether review of pipelines, or other energy transport infra-
structure, should go beyond the pipeline to examine how more transport will impact 
upstream energy production and downstream energy demand. 
Part III explains the U.S. government’s inconsistent practices and pronounce-
ments on considering upstream and downstream emissions for pipelines, port facil-
ities, and power transmission. It shows how this confusion has spread to other coun-
tries seeking to follow the U.S. model. It examines the few environmental assess-
ments, both in the United States and abroad, that have attempted to do a wider as-
sessment of upstream and downstream emissions, showing how they failed to pro-
vide useful information to regulators. It demonstrates that, even in theory, it is nearly 
impossible to draw conclusions about how a single energy transport project will af-
fect global energy markets. In doing so, it surveys the market changes that are fuel-
ing the drive for new energy transport infrastructure. 
Part IV shows how upstream and downstream reviews of energy transport pro-
jects in the United States tend to encroach on the authority of its energy trading 
partners to strike a balance between environmental and economic concerns in their 
own energy markets. If a U.S. regulator rejects a pipeline, port facility, or transmis-
sion line in order to prevent development of energy markets in another country, it 
                                                   
L. REV. 473, 534 (2010) (“Agencies should be required to quantify the projected GHG emis-
sions for each of the proposed alternatives in an EA and use a numerical threshold to deter-
mine whether the GHG emissions are significant.”). 
26 See infra text accompanying notes 62–64, 159, 160. 
27 See infra text accompanying notes 119–130. 
28 See infra text accompanying notes 172–176. 
29 See infra text accompanying notes 128–129. 
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asserts that it has both the power and the authority to control energy markets in that 
foreign country. This assertion is a recipe for conflict in energy trade and it is already 
becoming apparent that countries, advocating for their industries, will take every 
opportunity to cloak protectionist and mercantilist policies in the guise of environ-
mental assessment. Even when energy markets are purely domestic, the same dy-
namic may strain the balance of power in energy federalism: if the federal govern-
ment begins using reviews of interstate infrastructure to control upstream and down-
stream energy markets that have traditionally been regulated by the states, it will 
engender opposition to federal environmental review of these projects.  
Part V considers how the law should be adjusted to ensure that environmental 
assessments focus on areas where they will be helpful to regulators and avoid pro-
voking energy trade conflict. Courts and agencies should make plain that the up-
stream and downstream market impacts of energy transport projects are generally 
not impacts that must be assessed in environmental reviews. They should also make 
clear that environmental assessments will not turn on how a project will impact en-
ergy markets in another jurisdiction. If necessary, Congress should mandate these 
principles by amendment of the National Environmental Policy Act. This Part con-
cludes by discussing some of the rare instances where a review of the upstream or 
downstream impact of a transport project might be appropriate, suggesting how 
courts and agencies can recognize and provide for these exceptions. 
 
II.  THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT AND THE COUNCIL  
ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY GUIDANCE 
 
There is no shortage of case law or commentary on the National Environmental 
Policy Act, but unfortunately none of it makes clear whether environmental review 
of an energy transport project should include a review of how more transport would 
affect upstream and downstream markets. The National Environmental Policy Act 
itself only requires that when the federal government takes “major Federal actions 
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment” it must include “a de-
tailed statement” on “the environmental impact of the proposed action” and “any 
adverse environmental effects” that it will entail.30 This detailed statement is known 
                                                   
30 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012). 
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as an “environmental impact statement”31 and must also describe “alternatives to the 
proposed action.”32   
Since NEPA was enacted in 1970, this seemingly simple command has accreted 
myriad complications and ramifications through interpretation by the courts and the 
U.S. Council on Environmental Quality, which is authorized by Congress to consult 
with federal agencies on interpreting NEPA.33 And the Council on Environmental 
Quality has recently finalized guidance for consideration of a project’s climate 
change impacts.34 But neither this old case law nor this new guidance, since with-
drawn, provides any clear rule about whether upstream and downstream emissions 
should be considered in environmental reviews of energy transport infrastructure.  
The notoriously convoluted case law governing environmental reviews under 
the National Environmental Policy Act does not provide a clear answer on the ap-
propriate scope of review for energy transport projects.35 Under Supreme Court prec-
edents and longstanding Council on Environmental Quality guidance, environmen-
tal reviews under NEPA must consider indirect impacts of a federally approved ac-
tion when those impacts are “reasonably foreseeable.”36 The Supreme Court has 
identified two main factors to determine whether an indirect effect is reasonably 
foreseeable. First, the courts must use the analogy of “proximate cause from tort 
                                                   
31 If a federal agency action does not have a significant impact on the environment, the 
agency may issue an “environmental assessment” including a Finding of No Significant Im-
pact. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4(e), 1508.9(a), 1508.13 (2012) (describing an environmental 
assessment as a “concise public document”). Of course, when the agency determines its ac-
tion has no significant impact, it does not issue an environmental impact statement. See Dep’t 
of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 757–58 (2004) (“If . . . an agency determines that 
an [environmental impact statement] is not required . . . it must issue a ‘finding of no signif-
icant impact’ (FONSI), which briefly presents the reasons why the proposed agency action 
will not have a significant impact on the human environment.”). 
32 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(iii) (2012). 
33 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (1970) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4332(B) (2012)). 
34 Memorandum from Christina Goldfuss, U.S. Council on Envtl. Quality, to the Heads 
of Federal Departments and Agencies 1–6 (Aug. 1, 2016), https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files 
/2016/08/f33/nepa_final_ghg_guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7P8-PJTX]. 
35 NEPA has been the foundation for so much case law that it is sometimes called the 
“Magna Carta” of environmental law. Arthur W. Murphy, The National Environmental Pol-
icy Act and the Licensing Process: Environmentalist Magna Carta or Agency Coup De 
Grace?, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 963, 963 (1972). And this complex case law is often inconsistent 
as well. See Todd S. Aagard, A Functional Approach to Risks and Uncertainties Under 
NEPA, 1 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 87, 100–02 (2012) (describing “overall incoherence 
in how courts are confronting issues of risk and uncertainty in NEPA cases”). 
36 Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 763–64 (2004). 
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law,”37 noting that “proximate cause analysis turns on policy considerations and con-
siderations of the ‘legal responsibility’ of actors.”38 Second, the courts must consider 
whether “any new potential information” from considering these indirect effects 
would be “useful[] . . . to the decisionmaking process.”39 At first blush, this standard 
provides little concrete guidance in the case of expanded energy transport reviews, 
because the central point of contention between proponents and opponents of wider 
pipeline reviews is whether considering upstream and downstream impacts provides 
useful information or is wise as a matter of policy.40  
The decisions of lower courts have not provided any clearer rule. The most 
relevant cases for energy transport projects are three recent District of Columbia 
Circuit holdings. Two hold that FERC and the Department of Energy are not obliged 
to consider upstream gas production and downstream consumption when they ap-
prove liquefied natural gas facilities and exports.41 The third held that FERC is re-
quired to consider the downstream impact of a natural gas pipeline on gas consump-
tion.42 This most recent opinion, issued by a different panel less than a week after 
the most recent liquefied natural gas decision, did not explain how the disparate de-
cisions were consistent.43 Otherwise, the best case for advocates of expanded envi-
ronmental reviews for pipelines and energy transport is a decision of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which held that construction of a 
railroad line required at least some consideration of increased coal use that the line 
                                                   
37 Id. at 767. See also Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 
(1989) (“The statutory requirement that a federal agency contemplating a major action pre-
pares such an environmental impact statement . . . ensures that the agency, in reaching its 
decision, will have available, and will carefully consider, detailed information concerning 
significant environmental impacts.”); Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 
460 U.S. 766, 774 (1983) (explaining that a reasonably close causal relationship is similar to 
the proximate cause doctrine in tort law). 
38 Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 767 (quoting W. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON 
LAW OF TORTS 264, 274–75 (5th ed. 1984)). 
39 Id. 
40 See infra Parts III, IV. 
41 Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 827 F.3d 36, 46–49 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 
(holding that no consideration of upstream production and downstream combustion was re-
quired because agencies other than FERC had the authority to prevent those results); Sierra 
Club v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, Case No. 15-1489 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 15, 2017) 
https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/02747B91566F24638525817D004EC 
C42/$file/15-1489-1688746.pdf [https://perma.cc/HHJ6-TRA7]. 
42 Sierra Club v. U.S. Fed. Energy. Reg. Comm’n, Case No. 16-1329 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 
22, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/assets/2017/08/22/document_gw_01.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/B4QQ-8SYD]. 
43 Id. 
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would enable.44 Other circuits, however, have resisted an expansive reading of this 
decision.45 
Given that the case law offered no clear answer, many hoped that the Council 
on Environmental Quality would issue guidance that would make plain the rules for 
reviewing energy transport infrastructure.46 And in August 2016, the Council on En-
vironmental Quality did finalize guidance.47 During the development of this guid-
ance, the most controversial (and informative) statement had been a suggestion in 
draft guidance that environmental reviews of energy projects should consider up-
stream and downstream impacts that have a “reasonably close causal relationship to 
                                                   
44 Mid States Coal. for Progress v. Surface Transp. Bd., 345 F.3d 520, 548–50 (8th Cir. 
2003). Railroads, like highways, arguably present a stronger case for considering how they 
will enable development because the federal government often builds or subsidizes these 
forms of transport with the primary goal of inducing economic activity by connecting outly-
ing areas to interstate commerce. BARRY B. LEPATNER, TOO BIG TO FALL: AMERICA’S FAIL-
ING INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE WAY FORWARD xix, 50–51 (2010) (discussing the transcon-
tinental railroad and the Federal Highway Administration); Robert Cervero, Road Expan-
sion, Urban Growth, and Induced Travel: A Path Analysis, 69 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N. 145, 156 
(2003) (discussing how improved road transportation spurs economic activity along travel 
corridors). 
45 Sierra Club, 827 F.3d at 48 (“Even assuming the correctness of a decision that does 
not bind this circuit, this case looks nothing like Mid States.”); Habitat Educ. Ctr. v. U.S. 
Forest Serv., 609 F.3d 897, 902 (7th Cir. 2010) (“To the extent plaintiffs are arguing that the 
Eighth Circuit’s decision in Mid States is in tension with [other circuits’] consensus” “that 
an agency decision may not be reversed for failure to mention a project not capable of mean-
ingful discussion . . . we reject their reading of that decision.”).  
A common NEPA dispute that raises similar issues to indirect effects analysis is the 
question whether a federal decision on one segment of a project means that the entire project 
must undergo an environmental assessment. This doctrine is often referred to as the “small 
federal handle” doctrine because it says a small federal action may require environmental 
review of a large private project. Some decisions have required review of such projects. See 
Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 881–82  (1st Cir. 1985) (holding that the Army Corps 
of Engineers must consider environmental impact of the industrial park enabled by the cause-
way that it permitted). And others have not. See Save the Bay, Inc. v. U.S. Corps of Eng’rs, 
610 F.2d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding there is no need to consider manufacturing facility 
that required federal approval of an outfall pipeline); Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Ray, 
621 F.2d 269, 272 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that approval of water crossings did not require 
review of entire transmission line). 
46 Michael Burger & Jessica Wentz, CEQ Issues Final Guidance on Climate Change 
and NEPA with Two Key Changes from 2014 Draft, COLUM. CLIMATE L. BLOG (Aug. 3, 
2016), http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2016/08/03/ceq-issues-final-guidance-
on-climate-change-and-nepa-with-two-key-changes-from-2014-draft/ [https://perma.cc/32 
9K-B9EC] (noting that this “much-anticipated” guidance “comes after a lengthy process of 
public engagement and interagency consultation”). 
47 Memorandum from Christina Goldfuss, supra note 34, at 1–34. 
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the [federal] action.”48 That standard was still open to interpretation because a key 
dispute about “climate tests” is whether upstream and downstream impacts may be 
causally linked to energy transport infrastructure. In other words, the draft guidance 
left open the question how often upstream and downstream impacts bear a “reason-
ably close causal relationship” to an energy transport project. Nevertheless, some 
observers believed that this reference to upstream and downstream emissions might 
encourage federal agencies to broaden their environmental reviews of energy 
transport projects.49 
But even this wishy washy statement proved too controversial for a federal gov-
ernment riven by internal dissension on the idea of a climate test.50 One of the few 
changes to the draft guidance was removing this reference to upstream and down-
stream emissions.51 In doing so, the Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) 
                                                   
48 Revised Draft Guidance for Federal Departments and Agencies on Consideration of 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and the Effects of Climate Change in NEPA Reviews, 79 Fed. 
Reg. 77,802 (Dec. 24, 2014) (“In addition, emissions from activities that have a reasonably 
close causal relationship to the Federal action, such as those that may occur as a predicate 
for the agency action (often referred to as upstream emissions) and as a consequence of the 
agency action (often referred to as downstream emissions) should be accounted for in the 
NEPA analysis.”).  
49 Hannah Northey, White House NEPA Guidance Could Trigger Change at FERC, 
E&E NEWS (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060010881 
[https://perma.cc/RX4E-W7KK].  
50 See, e.g., Letter from U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency to U.S. Fed. Energy Regulatory 
Comm’n at 2 (Oct. 11, 2016) (on file with author) (FERC’s environmental review “perpetu-
ates the significant emission” by not considering downstream impact and so “[w]e . . . re-
quest a headquarters level meeting with us to seek a definitive resolution to this matter before 
you [approve the pipelines] and so that you do not continue to take this approach in additional 
NEPA documents”).  
51 Predictably, observers placed widely varying interpretations on this change. See Ad-
vocates Reject Industry Claims NEPA Rulings Curtail CEQ’s Climate Guide, IN-
SIDEEPA/CLIMATE (July 26, 2016), https://insideepaclimate.com/share/180688?s=07272016 
[https://perma.cc/62ND-PJFW] (noting that recent appellate rulings have held that “the 
[DOE], not the [FERC] is still responsible for assessing the upstream and downstream cli-
mate impacts of LNG projects”). Compare Howard L. Nelson & Francesca Ciliberti-Ayres, 
CEQ Issues Measured Final Guidance for Federal Agencies in their Consideration of GHG 
Emissions in NEPA Reviews, GREENBERG TRAURIG LLP (Aug. 4, 2016), 
http://www.gtlaw.com/News-Events/Publications/Alerts/197007/CEQ-Issues-Measured-Fi-
nal-Guidance-for-Federal-Agencies-in-their-Consideration-of-GHG-Emissions-in-NEPA-
Reviews [https://perma.cc/E9AC-YE9E ] (“Perhaps most notably, the CEQ’s Final Guid-
ance removed the most controversial aspect of the Draft Guidance which was its explicit 
instruction that agencies’ NEPA analyses take into account GHG emissions from upstream 
and downstream sources.”) with Burger & Wentz, supra note 46 (“[R]emoval of this lan-
guage from the final guidance does not mean that agencies can simply ignore all ‘upstream’ 
or ‘downstream’ emissions in their NEPA reviews” and, in fact, supports these authors’ ar-
gument that “upstream and downstream emissions do fall within the scope of the NEPA 
review for fossil fuel-related projects.”).  
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granted the request of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, which approves 
natural gas pipelines and liquefaction terminals, and had asked that the language be 
removed.52 In its place, the guidance simply stated that “agencies should consider 
and disclose the reasonably foreseeable direct and indirect emissions when analyz-
ing the direct and indirect effects of the proposed action.”53 That is a mere restate-
ment of existing Council on Environmental Quality guidance, which mandates con-
sideration of indirect impacts when they are “reasonably foreseeable.”54 In the end, 
even this unhelpful guidance was withdrawn by the new administration.55 Thus, in 
the end, neither the case law nor the CEQ guidance provides any clear answers on 
whether federal environmental reviews should consider upstream and downstream 
emissions from pipelines and other energy transport projects. 
 
III.  THE MIXED AND INCONSISTENT PRACTICE OF UPSTREAM AND DOWNSTREAM 
ASSESSMENTS OF ENERGY TRANSPORT PROJECTS 
 
If pipeline projects and pipeline approvals themselves were once obscure, the 
scope of environmental assessments for pipelines would seem like the archetypal 
arcana.56 But the media firestorm surrounding Keystone XL made it a stand in for 
broader disputes about energy and climate.57 So perhaps it is not shocking that, in 
2013, when President Obama laid out his new climate plan at a highly publicized 
                                                   
52 Letter from Ann F. Miles, U.S Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, to Horst Greczmiel, 
Council on Envtl. Quality 1–2 (Feb. 23, 2015), https://www.eenews.net/as-
sets/2017/02/23/document_gw_10.pdf [https://perma.cc/48UZ-YLNC] (requesting “that the 
Revised Draft Guidance not direct agencies to expand their NEPA analyses to consider the 
impacts of wide-ranging upstream and downstream activities that are neither causally related 
to the proposed action nor reasonably foreseeable”). 
53 Memorandum from Christina Goldfuss, supra note 34, at 16. It also suggested that 
“connected actions” should only be considered “subject to reasonable limits based on feasi-
bility and practicality” of assessing those emissions, again without providing examples of 
what kind of reviews should be considered reasonable or practical. Id. at 13. 
54 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b) (mandating consideration of “[i]ndirect effects, which are 
caused by the action and are later in time or farther removed in distance, but are still reason-
ably foreseeable”). 
55 Withdrawal of Final Guidance for Federal Departments and Agencies on Consider-
ation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and the Effects of Climate Change in National Environ-
mental Policy Act Reviews, 82 Fed. Reg. 16576 (Apr. 5, 2017) 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-04-05/pdf/2017-06770.pdf. 
56 Krugel, supra note 1. 
57 See generally Coral Davenport, Report Opens Way to Approval of Keystone Pipeline, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/01/us/politics/report-may-
ease-way-to-approval-of-keystone-pipeline.html [https://perma.cc/5A63-T57U] (providing 
an example of environmental and industry groups using a pipeline assessment as an oppor-
tunity to express differing and broader viewpoints on energy and climate). 
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speech at Georgetown University he made a digression to announce a new environ-
mental assessment standard for Keystone XL—it would be assessed based on its 
impact on international energy markets: 
 
Now, I know there’s been . . . a lot of controversy surrounding the pro-
posal to build a pipeline, the Keystone pipeline, that would carry oil from 
Canadian tar sands down to refineries in the Gulf. And the State Depart-
ment is going through the final stages of evaluating the proposal. That’s 
how it’s always been done. But I do want to be clear: Allowing the Key-
stone pipeline to be built requires a finding that doing so would be in our 
nation’s interest. And our national interest will be served only if this pro-
ject does not significantly exacerbate the problem of carbon pollution. The 
net effects of the pipeline’s impact on our climate will be absolutely criti-
cal to determining whether this project is allowed to go forward.58 
 
Of course, President Obama was not referring to greenhouse gas emissions by 
the Keystone XL pipeline itself—steel piping does not emit air pollution. By “net 
effects of the pipeline,” he was referring to the emissions from increased oil produc-
tion in Canada which, from that moment forward, were the public focus of the State 
Department’s review.59 
But the salience of the pipeline and the President’s announcement have left 
some legal observers with the inaccurate impression that the United States has es-
tablished a new and consistent practice of assessing the impact of energy transport 
                                                   
58 President Barack Obama, Remarks by President Obama on Climate Change (June 
25, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/25/remarks-president-cli-
mate-change [https://perma.cc/YZ38-GT3Y]. It is interesting how closely the former Presi-
dent’s speech parallels the objections that the Natural Resource Defense Council made to the 
original Keystone pipeline—objections that President Obama’s State Department success-
fully resisted in court. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 3, at 52 (“The proposal makes it 
clear that the pipeline is being built, primarily to increase imports of synthetic crude oil from 
the Canadian tar sands region. Canada’s tar sands region, located within the Western Cana-
dian Sedimentary Basin, is a leading example of the type of development underway in this 
rush to develop unconventional oil. More importantly, the proposed TransCanada Keystone 
Pipeline is integral in this effort to expand exploitation of tar sands oil resources in Northern 
Alberta.”). 
59 See, e.g., Maximilian Aufhammer, It just doesn’t add up. Why I think not building 
Keystone XL will likely leave a billion barrels worth of bitumen in the ground, ENERGY INST. 
AT HAAS: ENERGY INST. BLOG (Mar. 24, 2014), https://energyathaas.word-
press.com/2014/03/24/it-just-doesnt-add-up-why-i-think-not-building-keystone-xl-will-
likely-leave-a-billion-barrels-worth-of-bitumen-in-the-ground/ [https://perma.cc/TA6Y-
ZKL3]; Peter Erickson & Michael Lazarus, Impact of the Keystone XL pipeline on global oil 
markets and greenhouse gas emissions, NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE, Aug. 2014, at 1, 1–3; 
Christ Marshall, Keystone XL Would Increase Greenhouse Gas Pollution, SCI. AM. (Aug. 
11, 2014), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/keystone-xl-would-increase-green-
house-gas-pollution/ [https://perma.cc/D3L6-SUKG]. 
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projects on global energy markets.60 Nothing could be further from the truth: four 
and a half years later, the U.S. practice on environmental assessments has not yet 
begun to answer the questions raised by the President’s climate speech.61 
This Section explores in detail how this confusion has manifested in govern-
mental reviews of oil, gas, coal, and power transport projects. But it is helpful to 
begin by identifying several of the overarching questions that continue to bedevil 
environmental assessments of these transport projects: 
 
(1)  The first pressing question is whether President Obama’s focus on oil pro-
duction in Canada, upstream of the Keystone XL pipeline, will be applied to 
any other pipelines or other new energy transport facilities. For example, the 
U.S. is considering several liquefied natural gas (“LNG”) export proposals62—
should it be assessing how those facilities might increase natural gas production 
in the United States? Federal agencies are divided on this question.63 
(2)  Second, should future environmental reviews consider how energy 
transport projects encourage energy consumption in the downstream markets 
that they serve? Should federal reviews of LNG facilities be assessing how 
those facilities might increase natural gas use in Europe and Asia? Again, fed-
eral agencies are divided.64 
                                                   
60 See Demerse, supra note 21 (arguing that, like the United States, pipeline reviews 
should “consider not just the impact of the pipeline itself, but also the impact of the product 
that flows through it”). 
61 See SALONI JAIN ET AL., SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, HOW DID FEDERAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE IN 2016? iii (2017), 
http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/files/2017/02/Jain-et-al-2017-02-How-Did-Federal-EISs-
Address-Climate-Change-in-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/DFD2-RF3Q] (reviewing 31 envi-
ronmental impact statements and concluding that consideration of indirect effects in these 
statements was it appeared “tended to occur on an ad hoc basis, perhaps due to a lack of 
guidance about the scope of indirect emissions that should be considered for different types 
of projects”). 
62 See, e.g., James W. Coleman, Importing Energy, Exporting Regulation, 83 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1357, 1363–67 (2014) (describing the energy transport boom in LNG and other fossil 
fuels); see also FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, NORTH AMERICAN LNG EXPORT TERMINALS: 
PROPOSED 1 (2017), https://www.ferc.gov/industries/gas/indus-act/lng/lng-proposed-ex-
port.pdf [https://perma.cc/WE2D-RFC2]. 
63 See Letter from U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 50, at 2 (FERC’s environmental 
review “perpetuates the significant emission” by not considering downstream impact and so 
“[w]e . . . request a headquarters level meeting with us to seek a definitive resolution to this 
matter before you [approve the pipelines] and so that you do not continue to take this ap-
proach in additional NEPA documents”). 
64 Letter from U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency to Kimberly D. Bose, U.S. Fed. Energy Regu-
latory Comm’n at 2–6 (Jan. 19, 2016) (on file with author) (FERC’s environmental reviews 
of liquefied natural gas terminals must add assessment of “emissions associated with the 
production, transport, and combustion of the natural gas.”). 
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(3)  Third, when the upstream and downstream impacts of an energy transport 
project involve production and consumption in other countries, should the 
agencies assess whether that foreign production and consumption is desirable? 
(4)  Fourth, should the government consider all upstream and downstream im-
pacts of an energy transport facility? Or should it focus only on global pollu-
tants such as greenhouse gases? For instance, if the U.S. government authorizes 
more hydropower imports from Canada, should it consider the impacts of Ca-
nadian hydropower dams on aquatic species in Canada? 
(5)  Fifth, how can the government predict the effect of a single energy 
transport facility on global energy markets, especially when there are compet-
ing modes of transport? For example, the most controversial part of the State 
Department’s assessment of Keystone XL was its conclusion that denying the 
pipeline would actually increase global greenhouse gas emissions because oil 
would just move by trains instead.65 
(6)  Sixth, even if the government can estimate the impact of a pipeline or 
power line on upstream and downstream markets, how should it use that infor-
mation to make a decision? Should it, as President Obama suggested, shut 
down any facility that encourages fossil fuel production? If so, how does that 
interact with the traditional standard for reviewing energy transport projects, 
which approves them only if they support energy production?66 
 
The United States government has not answered any of these questions. This 
inconsistency is likely the result of persistent interagency disagreement on the 
proper scope of review, with the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) favor-
ing expanded environmental review and the agencies responsible for approving in-
frastructure, such as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) and the 
Army Corps of Engineers opposing such review.67 Thus, despite constant discussion 
of a new “Keystone” or “climate” test for new infrastructure, there is abiding and 
deep uncertainty about how infrastructure must be reviewed. 
  
                                                   
65 See, e.g., U.S. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Order Denying Applications for 
Certificate and Section 3 Authorization, 154 FERC ¶ 61,190 (Mar. 11, 2016). 
66 See U.S. Fed. Energy Reg. Commission, Order Granting Authorization under Section 
3 of the Natural Gas Act and Issuing Certificates, 147 FERC ¶ 61,230 (June 19, 2014) (ap-
proving liquefied natural gas facility because it would lead to “increased production” as well 
as “increased economic activity and job creation, support for continued natural gas explora-
tion, and increased tax revenue”). 
67 See supra text accompanying notes 63–64; infra text accompanying notes 159–160; 
see also BUREAU OF OCEAN & ENERGY MGMT., OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS 
LEASING PROGRAM: 2012–2017: FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATE-
MENT 8–37 (2012) (rejecting consideration of upstream and downstream impacts for oil 
leases). 
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In fact, Keystone XL’s environmental review is emblematic of U.S. reviews of 
energy transport in another way: the confused and inconsistent environmental re-
view standards applied to all oil pipelines during the seven years that Keystone XL 
was reviewed reflect a wider confusion over how all U.S. energy transport facilities 
should be assessed.68  
 
A.  Oil Transport 
 
Though Keystone XL has received the bulk of attention, in the seven years that 
it was under review, several other oil pipelines were approved, under very different 
environmental assessment processes.69 Only international pipelines require a Presi-
dential Permit; domestic interstate oil pipelines are primarily regulated by the indi-
vidual states that they cross.70 Of course, domestic pipelines still cross federal, nav-
igable waters, which requires a Clean Water Act permit that could, in theory, require 
an environmental review under NEPA. But as the Keystone XL pipeline was being 
delayed, the Obama administration reissued a twelve page nationwide general per-
mit that allows domestic pipelines to be built without any individualized environ-
mental review or review of their effects on energy markets.71 At the same time, Pres-
ident Obama issued a memorandum to expedite all reviews of domestic pipeline 
projects.72 In fact, TransCanada itself took advantage of these expedited procedures, 
cutting the Keystone XL project into two halves and then building the southern por-
tion, from Cushing, Oklahoma to the U.S. Gulf Coast.73 
                                                   
68 See JEAN-PAUL RODRIGUE ET AL., THE GEOGRAPHY OF TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 
294–301 (4th ed. 2017). 
69 See, e.g., Robert Tuttle, Keystone Left Behind as Canadian Oil Pours into U.S., 
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 14, 2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-14/key-
stone-left-behind-as-canadian-oil-pours-into-u-s- [https://perma.cc/5VRY-J6WG] (noting 
construction of Flanagan South and Seaway pipelines). 
70 See Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 990 F. Supp. 2d 9, 26 n.13 (D.D.C. 
2013) (denying motion for preliminary injunction against domestic crude oil pipeline be-
cause it, unlike Keystone XL “is an entirely domestic pipeline”). 
71 See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, NATIONWIDE PERMIT 12, 4 (2012), 
http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/NWP_12_2012.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HBD8-QYMR] (environmental analysis that accompanies domestic crude 
pipelines makes no mention of climate change). 
72 See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Presidential Memorandum—Expediting 
Review of Pipeline Projects from Cushing, Oklahoma, to Port Arthur, Texas, and Other Do-
mestic Pipeline Infrastructure Projets (Mar. 22, 2012), https://obamawhitehouse.ar-
chives.gov/the-press-office/2012/03/22/presidential-memorandum-expediting-review-pipe-
line-projects-cushing-okla [https://perma.cc/X6LN-Z9TJ].  
73 See Alexandra B. Klass & Danielle Meinhardt, Transporting Oil and Gas: U.S. In-
frastructure Challenges, 100 IOWA L. REV. 947, 978 (2015); see also Scott Haggett & Nia 
Williams, TransCanada Activates Gulf Coast Project Pipeline, Delivering Crude Oil from 
Oklahoma to Texas, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/20 
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Thus, far from reflecting a new comprehensive approach to oil pipelines, the 
Keystone XL review represented just one side of a newly bifurcated two track pro-
cess. Pipelines that, like Keystone XL, required a full federal environmental review 
would now be subject to an expanded review in which the environmental impact 
statement would have to consider upstream emissions from the pipeline project. Run 
of the mill oil pipelines, by contrast, would receive no individualized environmental 
review. 
These two levels of scrutiny may reflect President Obama’s stated goal of in-
creasing pipeline transport for U.S. oil, but not Canadian oil.74 And the need for 
increased pipeline transport is indeed urgent: U.S. oil production has nearly doubled 
in the past seven years because of hydraulic fracturing, rising from under five million 
barrels per day in 2008, to nearly ten million barrels per day in 2015.75 This has 
meant much larger volumes of oil traveling by methods such as crude by rail, that 
are more expensive and less safe than oil pipelines.76 
                                                   
14/01/22/transcanada-gulf-coast-project-pipeline_n_4646562.html [https://perma.cc/5CJE-
7WZ8] (describing construction of southern portion of the Keystone XL pipeline, known as 
the “Gulf Coast Project”). 
74 Glen Kessler, Obama’s Claim that Keystone XL Oil ‘Bypasses the U.S.’ Earns Four 
Pinocchios, WASH. POST (Mar. 2, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-
checker/wp/2015/03/02/obamas-claim-that-keystone-xl-oil-bypasses-the-u-s-earns-four-pi-
nocchios/?utm_term=.56907934fcf6 [https://perma.cc/S8FJ-M3KZ] (“I’ve already said I’m 
happy to look at how we can increase pipeline production for U.S. oil, but Keystone is for 
Canadian oil to send that down to the Gulf.”). Note that this sentiment has been mirrored in 
lawsuits against natural gas pipelines where plaintiffs specifically contend “that a Canadian 
company like Enbridge shouldn’t be allowed to take property from U.S. landowners.” Home-
owners Sue to Stop Ohio Gas Pipeline Construction, U.S. NEWS (May 14, 2017), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/ohio/articles/2017-05-14/homeowners-sue-to-
stop-ohio-gas-pipeline-construction [https://perma.cc/JFF5-XLSE]. 
75 U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Petroleum & Other Liquids: Crude Oil Production, 
EIA.GOV (July 31, 2017), https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_crd_crpdn_adc_mbblpd_m. 
htm [https://perma.cc/3KMU-CBXW].  
76 Crude by rail is a particularly dangerous option for transporting the light and highly 
flammable crude oil unlocked by hydraulic fracturing. In just one incident, a train carrying 
oil from new oil fields in North Dakota derailed in the Canadian town of Lac Mégantic, 
killing 47 people in a massive explosion. Grant Robertson, North Dakota’s Explosive Bakken 
Oil: The Story Behind a Troubling Crude, GLOBE & MAIL (Dec. 31, 2014), http://www.theg-
lobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-news/energy-and-resources/north-dakotas-
explosive-bakken-oil-the-story-behind-a-troubling-crude/article16157981/ [https://perma.cc 
/CV6J-UCQD]; BUREAU OF OCEANS & INT’L. ENVTL. & SCI. AFFAIRS, supra note 15, at ES-
12 (estimating that transport by rail instead of pipeline could cost oil producer “up to $8” 
extra per barrel of oil transported); see also id. at ES-35 (estimating that denying the Key-
stone XL pipeline “would result in an estimated 49 additional injuries and six additional 
fatalities . . . on an annual basis” due to increased oil transport by rail); Klass & Meinhardt, 
supra note 73, at 974–75, 974 n.172 (discussing how crude oil is transported by rail because 
of the existing rail infrastructure in the U.S. that is widely used, despite this method being 
less safe and more expensive). 
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President Obama’s bifurcated approach to pipeline review is one of the reasons 
that the Dakota Access Pipeline became a rallying point for both opponents and pro-
ponents of pipelines.77 Both sides knew that if the federal government did a full en-
vironmental review, including an environmental impact statement for the pipeline, 
that would almost certainly include a lengthy assessment of upstream markets, like 
the controversial and extended review performed on the Keystone XL project. As a 
result, the legal controversy over Dakota Access has focused on whether the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers, the federal agency responsible for the project, should 
have done an environmental impact statement.78  
In July 2016, the Army Corps found that the Dakota Access pipeline’s route, 
which crossed hundreds of federal water bodies, would have “no significant impact” 
on the environment.79 This decision, taken after consultation with affected Indian 
tribes and public notice and comment, meant that the Army Corps would not do a 
full environmental impact statement.80 The Standing Rock Sioux Tribe moved for a 
preliminary injunction to block the pipeline but the D.C. District Court denied the 
tribe’s motion, ruling that the Army Corps’s decision to approve the pipeline had 
likely complied with the law.81 But just moments after the court issued its decision 
the Army Corps of Engineers, the Department of Justice, and the Department of 
Interior jointly announced that the pipeline would be halted, and that the Army Corps 
would reconsider its previous decisions, shocking both proponents and opponents of 
the pipeline.82  
In December 2016, the Army Corps of Engineers decided that its previous de-
cisions were valid but that it would not approve construction of the pipeline until it 
                                                   
77 See Peter Baker & Coral Davenport, Trump Revives Keystone Pipeline Rejected by 
Obama, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/24/us/politics/key-
stone-dakota-pipeline-trump.html [https://perma.cc/RTP9-T2E7]. 
78 Steve Almasy, Dakota Access Pipeline: Army issues final permit, CNN POLITICS 
(Feb. 8, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/07/politics/dakota-access-pipeline-easement-
granted/index.html [https://perma.cc/VX8L-ZYN2]. 
79 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, MITIGATED FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT: EN-
VIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT DAKOTA ACCESS PIPELINE PROJECT WILLIAMS, MORTON, AND 
EMMONS COUNTIES, NORTH DAKOTA 2 (2016), http://www.energylawprof.com/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2017/03/DAPL-EA-VOL-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/EPZ8-W2VL]. 
80 Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 205 F. Supp. 3d 4, 23–24 
(D.D.C. 2016). 
81 Id. at 7. 
82 Ellen M. Gilmer, Dakota Access: Tribes Notch ‘Historic’ Win, But Political Battles 
Continue, E&E NEWS (Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060042643/ 
[https://perma.cc/EPZ8-W2VL]; Jack Healy & John Schwartz, U.S. Suspends Construction 
on Part of North Dakota Pipeline, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.ny-
times.com/2016/09/10/us/judge-approves-construction-of-oil-pipeline-in-north-dakota.htm 
l?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/5YN8-YPCL] (noting that opponents considered the “news . . . a 
stunning development,” while proponents found the move “deeply troubling [as it] could 
have a long-lasting chilling effect on private infrastructure development in the United 
States.”). 
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could perform a full environmental impact statement for the pipeline.83 This Army 
Corps reversal was subsequently re-reversed by the incoming administration and 
remains embroiled in court disputes.84 Environmental advocates continue to argue 
that the pipeline should receive a full environmental impact statement and climate 
test, following the Keystone XL precedent.85 Indeed, although reporting on the Da-
kota Access pipeline has often focused on Indian law and the rights of indigenous 
                                                   
83 Memorandum from Jo-Ellen Darcy, Office of the Assistant Sec’y, Dep’t of Army, to 
the Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs 3–4 (2016), https://www.army.mil/e2/c/down-
loads/459011.pdf [https://perma.cc/55GY-Q6TK]. On the other hand, the Army Corps reit-
erated that it had already approved the pipeline crossing and stood by its earlier finding, that 
the pipeline did not have a significant impact on the environment. Id. at 1, 4 (“On July 25, 
2016, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) granted a permission to applicant Dakota 
Access, L.L.C., under Section 14 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 408 
(Section 408 permission), for a proposed crossing of Lake Oahe, a Corps project on the Mis-
souri River . . . . The Section 408 permission was accompanied by an Environmental Assess-
ment, as contemplated under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 
§4321–4335, and its implement regulations . . . . The Environmental Assessment included a 
finding that granting the Section 408 permission for the proposed crossing of Lake Oahe did 
not constitute a major Federal action that would have significant environmental im-
pacts . . . . [T]his decision does not alter the Army’s position that the Corps’ prior reviews 
and actions have comported with legal requirements.”); Ellen M. Gilmer, Dakota Access: 
Obama Admin Denies Final Easement for Pipeline, E&E NEWS (Dec. 4, 2016), 
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060046601/ [https://perma.cc/K778-HABC]. 
84 See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, DEP’T OF ARMY, EASEMENT FOR FUEL CARRYING 
PIPELINE RIGHT-OF-WAY LOCATED ON LAKE OAHE PROJECT, MORTON AND EMMONS COUN-
TIES, NORTH DAKOTA 1–42 (2016), http://www.eenews.net/assets/2017/02/09/docu-
ment_ew_04.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z59N-HRGF]. This re-reversal from the Army Corps was 
made in response to direction from the new administration. Press Release, Office of the Press 
Sec’y, Presidential Memorandum Regarding Construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline 
(Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/24/presidential-
memorandum-regarding-construction-dakota-access-pipeline [https://perma.cc/EF3U-
9KKU]. Subsequently, the D.C. District court reviewing the case held that the Army Corps 
of Engineers should have done more to consider the danger of oil spills and the impacts of 
the pipeline on environmental justice and tribal rights. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Eng’rs, Memorandum Opinion, Case No., Case 1:16-cv-01534-JEB (D.D.C. 
Jun. 14, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/assets/2017/06/15/document_ew_03.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7JPP-RU6W]. But the court also held that the pipeline could remain in ser-
vice while the Army Corps addressed this deficiency. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Eng’rs, Memorandum Opinion, Case No., Case 1:16-cv-01534-JEB (D.D.C. 
Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/assets/2017/10/11/document_pm_04.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7356-XNXW]. 
85 Bill McKibben, Why Dakota Is the New Keystone, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/29/opinion/why-dakota-is-the-new-keystone.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/A9PQ-XPQG]; Hannah Northey, Senate Dems Call to Stop Project, Im-
pose Climate “Test,” E&E NEWS (Oct. 13, 2016), http://www.eenews.net/green-
wire/2016/10/13/stories/1060044209 [https://perma.cc/4595-4MFZ]; Letter from Sens. Ber-
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peoples, the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe is not represented by Indian law experts, but 
instead by an environmental nonprofit, Earthjustice, which generally focuses on the 
broader impact of the fossil fuel industry.86  
The confusion and controversy over how to review new pipelines is now 
spreading to other countries as politicians and campaigners that are focused on cli-
mate change hope to export this expanded form of environmental assessment to the 
                                                   
nard Sanders et al. to President Barack Obama (Oct. 13, 2016), http://www.sanders.sen-
ate.gov/download/letter-to-obama-on-dapl?inline=file [https://perma.cc/7MFX-X8UN] 
(comparing the pipeline to Keystone XL and declaring that “[a]ll fossil fuel infrastructure 
projects of this significance must be subjected to a test to consider the long term climate 
impacts.”). 
86 See, e.g., Standing Rock Sioux Tribe’s Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 
1-16-cv-1534-JEB (D.D.C. Feb. 14, 2017) Doc. 117-1 (listing Earthjustice as attorneys for 
Plaintiff).  
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rest of the world.87 Thus far, Canada has gone the furthest in implementing a Key-
stone XL style upstream analysis into its environmental reviews.88 In another sign 
of the increasing prominence of pipeline review, one of Prime Minister Justin Tru-
deau’s central promises as a candidate was to “ensure that environmental assess-
ments include an analysis of upstream impacts and greenhouse gas emissions result-
ing from projects under review.”89 More than two years after Prime Minister Tru-
deau’s election, it is still unclear how these expanded environmental reviews will 
                                                   
87 See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMIT-
TEE, THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS AND THE EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK 10 (2017), 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/2nd-report-state-energy-union_en. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/7JCN-EB3P] (“In view of scarce resources in the Member States, pub-
lic resources should be used smartly. Member States should make sure that their support to 
energy infrastructure in the widest sense is in line with the principles of the Energy Union. 
Support should only be given if in line with the long-term energy policy of the European 
Union, avoiding stranded assets and carbon lock in.”); Hilary Beaumont, Canadian Pipelines 
to Face Climate Test Like the One that Killed Keystone XL, VICE NEWS (Jan. 28, 2016), 
https://news.vice.com/article/canadian-pipelines-to-face-climate-test-like-the-one-that-
killed-keystone-xl [https://perma.cc/L5EC-DXL9] (discussing Canadian pipeline pro-
posals); Megan Darby, New Gas Pipelines Could Face EU Climate Test, CLIMATE HOME 
NEWS (Jan. 31, 2017), http://www.climatechangenews.com/2017/01/31/new-gas-pipelines-
could-face-eu-climate-test/ [https://perma.cc/W5V7-XEN7] (“A draft state of the energy un-
ion report, seen by Climate Home, urges member states to avoid funding infrastructure pro-
jects that are out of line with EU climate targets. It marks a shift in emphasis since last year, 
when new gas supply routes were touted as the main strategy to reduce reliance on Russian 
imports.”); Anthony Swift, The Lasting Legacy of the Keystone XL Debate Half a Year Later: 
Climate Change, NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL: EXPERT BLOG (May 6, 2016), 
https://www.nrdc.org/experts/anthony-swift/lasting-legacy-keystone-xl-debate-half-year-
later-climate-change [https://perma.cc/H8BF-UXET] (“Keystone XL has achieved a lasting 
legacy. The ‘keep it in the ground’ movement is going strong, having sprung like Hydra from 
the Keystone campaign. But our work will go on until the social license to extract and burn 
fossil fuels is gone. One can only hope that the unfolding tragedies at opposite ends of the 
world—last week’s news that half the Great Barrier Reef is dead from warming waters and 
this weeks [sic] burning of Fort McMurray—fatally erodes what remains of that social li-
cense.”); Demerse, supra note 21 (analyzing Canada’s discussion of pipelines). 
88 Katie Valentine, Canada Just Announced a Major Pipeline Reform, THINK PROGRESS 
(Jan. 28, 2016), https://thinkprogress.org/canada-just-announced-a-major-pipeline-reform-
9b1729c8b3e4  [https://perma.cc/U3PZ-5GMK]. 
89 Environmental Assessments, LIBERAL, https://www.liberal.ca/realchange/environ-
mental-assessments/ [https://perma.cc/5FXV-F2AT] (last visited Aug. 5, 2017); see also 
Tamsyn Burgmann, Justin Trudeau Unveils Liberals’ Environmental Platform, STAR (June 
29, 2015), https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2015/06/29/justin-trudeau-unveils-liber-
als-environmental-platform.html [https://perma.cc/N2XF-5JX2] (noting that despite their 
skepticism, environmental groups were particularly encouraged by “Trudeau’s commitments 
to including upstream carbon emissions in his proposed amendments to the environmental 
review process”); Allison Lampert, Canada to Set Climate Change Tests in Pipeline Re-
views: Trudeau, REUTERS (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-canada-energy-
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work. Initially, Trudeau’s new government simply promised to report the “up-
stream” emissions associated with existing oil pipeline proposals.90 Then it stated 
that it would consider upstream emissions from all oil and gas proposals, but seem-
ingly defined “upstream” narrowly to include only extraction, processing, handling, 
and transport of fossil fuels that is “exclusively linked to the project.”91  
Ultimately, the Canadian government simply approved expansion of the con-
troversial Trans Mountain pipeline, while simultaneously issuing a study on the up-
stream emissions from the project.92 The government’s approval did not offer expla-
nation of how that study affected its decision to approve the project, which will triple 
the amount of oil that can be carried from Alberta to Vancouver, British Columbia.93  
                                                   
environment-idUSKCN0V41GI [https://perma.cc/WS5D-AYFE] (“What we are going to 
roll out very soon, as we promised in our election campaign, is to establish a clear process 
which will consider all the greenhouse gas emissions tied to a project, which will build on 
the work already done.”). 
90 Interim Measures for Pipeline Reviews, GOV’T OF CAN., https://www.can-
ada.ca/en/natural-resources-canada/news/2016/01/interim-measures-for-pipeline-reviews. 
html [https://perma.cc/M6XB-84LH] (last modified Jan. 27, 2016) (stating that for two cur-
rent oil pipeline proposals, the government would “[a]ssess the upstream greenhouse gas 
emissions associated with this project and make this information public”). 
91 Estimating Upstream GHG Emissions, C. Gaz. pt. I, at 787 (Mar. 19. 2016) (Can.), 
http://www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p1/2016/2016-03-19/pdf/g1-15012.pdf [https://perma.cc/VX 
8L-ZYN2]. 
92 Ian Austen, Justin Trudeau Approves Oil Pipeline Expansion in Canada, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/29/world/canada/canada-trudeau-
kinder-morgan-pipeline.html [https://perma.cc/27NC-VBUX] (“[L]ike the protests that led 
the Obama administration to block the Keystone XL pipeline project from Canada, many 
people see blocking Kinder Morgan as a way to limit development of the oil sands.”); Prime 
Minister Justin Trudeau’s Pipeline Announcement, JUSTIN TRUDEAU, PRIME MINISTER OF 
CANADA (Nov. 30, 2016), http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2016/11/30/prime-minister-justin-tru-
deaus-pipeline-announcement [https://perma.cc/5SKP-T6T5] (“[T]here isn’t a country in the 
world that would find billions of barrels of oil and leave it in the ground while there is a 
market for it.”). 
93 Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s Pipeline Announcement, supra note 92 (“The pro-
ject will effectively triple our capacity to get Canadian energy resources to international mar-
kets beyond the United States.”). In late summer 2017, the Canadian government announced 
that it would consider downstream as well as upstream emissions for a new pipeline pro-
posal—TransCanada’s “Energy East” proposal to carry oil from Alberta to the east coast of 
Canada. Energy East Pipeline review to look at upstream, downstream GHG emissions, CBC 
NEWS, (Aug. 23, 2017), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/energy-east-pipeline-re-
view-ghg-greenhouse-gas-1.4259032 [https://perma.cc/ET5E-G34C]. Before it could be 
clarified how such a review would work, TransCanada canceled the project, citing the chang-
ing review process. TransCanada cancels $15.7B Energy East pipeline project, THE CAL-
GARY HERALD (Oct. 5, 2017), http://calgaryherald.com/business/energy/transcanada-can-
cels-energy-east-pipeline-project [https://perma.cc/2LZ7-NBD9]. 
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The study on upstream emissions related to the Trans Mountain project pro-
vides a helpful example of why such studies are so unlikely to produce useful infor-
mation. First, the government calculated the upstream greenhouse gas emissions that 
would be required to produce the quantity of oil that the expanded pipeline would 
carry.94 But the study quickly notes how complex it is to determine whether some or 
all of these emissions would be “incremental”95—that is, whether these emissions 
would occur because the pipeline was approved or whether they would instead occur 
whether or not the pipeline was approved.96 At the end of the day, the study con-
cludes that it is unlikely that any significant incremental emissions could be specif-
ically attributed to the pipeline.97 
Canada’s attempt to consider upstream emissions illustrates the fundamental 
difficulty of calculating the impact of a pipeline (or any other single energy transport 
proposal) on global energy markets. After all, if one pipeline is not approved, pro-
ducers may find other ways to ship their product to consumers.98 Even if producers 
do not find alternate transport to market and have to limit their oil production, their 
production is very likely to be replaced by increased oil production from other pro-
ducers in other countries around the world.99 The only way to limit oil production 
and consumption by pipeline blockade would be to cut off enough oil production to 
create a worldwide scarcity, raising the global price of oil enough to deter consump-
tion.100 So the upstream impact of an oil pipeline in some ways depends on its down-
stream impact: if oil consumers around the world just switch to other sources of oil, 
                                                   
94 ENV’T & CLIMATE CHANGE CAN., TRANS MOUNTAIN PIPELINE ULC–TRANS MOUN-
TAIN EXPANSION PROJECT: REVIEW OF RELATED UPSTREAM GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 
ESTIMATES 5 (Nov. 2016), http://www.energylawprof.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/ 
Trans-Mountain-Upstream-Emissions-Nov.pdf [https://perma.cc/3HHK-8UZY]. 
95 Id. at 5 (“The degree to which the estimated emissions associated with the additional 
capacity would be incremental depends on the considerations that drive investment decisions 
for crude oil producers, namely the expected price of oil, the availability and costs of other 
transportation modes (e.g., crude-by-rail), whether other pipeline projects are built, and costs 
of production.”). 
96 Id. at 5 n.1 (“The word incremental is used when discussing the production (and 
resulting emissions) that could be directly enabled by this project.”). 
97 Id. at 38–43 (concluding that the only scenario in which the pipeline could lead to 
increased greenhouse gas emissions is if (a) there were also other pipelines built from the 
same location, (b) oil prices rise above $60, and (c) oil that would have been produced else-
where in the world as an alternative to Canadian oil would have been produced using meth-
ods that emitted fewer greenhouse gas emissions or Canadian oil would increase global oil 
consumption by lowering global oil prices). 
98 Id. at 34–40 (considering the impact of different scenarios for pipeline approvals and 
crude by rail transport on oil production in Canada). 
99 Id. at 40–42 (considering what other types of fuels might be replaced by increased 
production from Canada). 
100 Id. at 41 (discussing the elasticity of global demand for oil—i.e. how much oil con-
sumption could decline in response to more expensive global oil supply). 
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blocking a particular source of oil production will have little net impact on global 
greenhouse gas emissions.101 
Thus, determining the impact of a single pipeline on global climate emissions 
means estimating (a) how much of the oil will get to market anyway; (b) which 
global producers will respond to make up any shortfall; (c) what quantity of green-
house gases those global producers emit; (d) whether the overall market adjustment 
will marginally raise prices; and (e) to what extent consumers will reduce their con-
sumption in response to that price increase.102 So even in theory it is difficult to 
predict how a pipeline will impact global energy markets. In practice, in unpredict-
ably changing energy markets, it is nearly impossible to predict the upstream and 
downstream impact of a new pipeline project.103  
Keystone XL itself is another excellent example of the futility of studying up-
stream emissions from a particular energy transport project. Tasked by the President 
with reviewing the pipeline’s impact on Canadian oil production, the State Depart-
ment initially concluded that it would have no impact because “any one crude oil 
transport project . . . is unlikely to significantly impact the rate of extraction” of 
oil.104 The State Department supported this statement with a lengthy market analysis 
which showed that at any price over $75 per barrel of oil, oil production would ex-
pand in Canada regardless of whether new pipelines were built.105 Even if all other 
pipeline proposals that could take Canadian oil were also rejected, producers would 
just pay a little more—$8 per barrel—to send oil by rail.106 So approving the pipeline 
would increase oil profits, increase transport safety,107 and actually decrease global 
greenhouse gas emissions by preventing inefficient and dangerous transport of oil 
by railroad tank car.108  
At the time that the State Department published this encouraging conclusion, 
oil prices had hovered near $100 per barrel for three years.109 But the Department 
recognized that oil prices could change, so it considered two other scenarios. Using 
the same economic models, it found that if oil prices fell to $65–$75 per barrel, then 
                                                   
101 Id.  
102 Id.  
103 Id. at 41–42. 
104 BUREAU OF OCEANS & INT’L. ENVTL. & SCI. AFFAIRS,  supra note 15, at ES-16. 
105 Id.  
106 Id. at ES-34 (estimating that rejecting the pipeline would lead to higher greenhouse 
gas emissions than approving it, due to the “28 to 42 percent” higher energy requirements of 
shipping crude by rail). 
107 Id. at ES-35 (estimating that approving the Keystone XL pipeline would prevent “49 
additional injuries and six additional fatalities . . . on an annual basis” by avoiding rail 
transport of oil). 
108 Id.  
109 U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Petroleum & Other Liquids, EIA.GOV (Aug. 2, 2017), 
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=RWTC&f=D [https://perma 
.cc/J6YT-GMBM] (showing that prices reached $100 per barrel in February 2011, three 
years before the State Department published its analysis and three and a half years before 
prices fell much lower, reach a low of $29 per barrel in February 2016). 
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rejecting the pipeline could have a drastic impact on Canadian oil production be-
cause rising transportation costs could endanger all new production projects; in this 
price band, rejecting the pipeline would potentially decrease new production by a 
volume even greater than the volume that the pipeline would have carried.110 Finally, 
if prices fell below $65 the State Department’s conclusions were more equivocal—
the models showed that, at that price, there would be no new projects regardless of 
what happened to the pipeline but the State Department speculated that rejecting the 
pipeline “could further curtail production.”111  
The State Department’s analysis of the upstream impact of the Keystone XL 
pipeline was state of the art: one hundred and fifty pages modeling the cost of 
transport by the new pipeline, the cost of transport by alternate routes, and the cost 
curve of upstream projects that could, in theory, depend on the new pipeline.112 It 
was also useless as a guide to action. 
By the time the State Department actually made a decision on the project, a 
barrel of oil was selling at $44 per barrel, so its years of analysis were beside the 
point.113 And even in theory, its carefully modeled conclusions had serious limita-
tions as both environmental and industry groups quickly pointed out: 
 
(1)   Is it plausible that lowering transport costs—and thus increasing profits—
of oil producers would not encourage any marginal investment in increased 
Canadian oil production? Maybe lowering the cost of transporting oil by $8 per 
barrel would not be the difference between opening and shuttering any major 
project. But surely some producers might do more to ramp up marginal pro-
duction if they were earning significantly more on each barrel of oil—shifting 
investments forward in time or doing more to raise the rate of production at 
existing projects.114 
                                                   
110 BUREAU OF OCEANS & INT’L ENVTL. & SCI. AFFAIRS, supra note 15, at ES-35. 
111 Id. at ES-12. 
112 See generally MICHAEL LAZARUS & PETER ERICKSON, GREENHOUSE GAS EMIS-
SIONS IMPLICATIONS OF THE KEYSTONE XL PIPELINE ii (2013), https://www.sei-interna-
tional.org/mediamanager/documents/Publications/Climate/SEI-WP-2013-11-KeystoneXL-
price-effects.pdf [https://perma.cc/2R6K-RJWW] (discussing climate policy and analysis, 
and “the role of energy transportation infrastructure in shaping energy systems, energy use 
and related greenhouse gase emissions”). 
113 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 9, at 12; U.S. Energy Info. Admin., supra note 109 
(showing that the price of oil in November 2015, when the State Department reached its 
decision was $44 per barrel). For a description of how this delay impacted investment in oil 
transport over this period, see James W. Coleman, Policymaking by Proposal: How Agencies 
Are Using Proposed Rules to Transform Industry Long Before Final Rules Are Tested in 
Court, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 497, 512–14 (2017). 
114 Erickson & Lazarus, supra note 59, at 1–3 (arguing that, contrary to the State De-
partment’s analysis, the Kestone XL pipeline could massively increase greenhouse gas emis-
sions from oil production). 
 
2018] BEYOND THE PIPELINE WARS 145 
 
(2)   Is it plausible that at exactly $75 per barrel of oil the pipeline would sud-
denly switch from having no impact at all on oil production to being an eco-
nomic necessity for the entire industry? Like the previous question, the implau-
sibility of this conclusion is likely driven by the limitations of economic models 
that produce false precision. 
(3)   Is it plausible that the rail system could, on the margin, take another pipe-
line worth of crude without drastically raising crude by rail costs?115 
(4)   Even if rejecting the pipeline would decrease oil production, and thus, 
greenhouse gas emissions in Canada, why would that necessarily have any net 
impact on the greenhouse gas emissions of the global oil industry? This ques-
tion was not discussed in the Keystone XL review but, as noted above, pre-
vented the Canadian reviews from reaching any firm conclusions.116 
 
The state of the art Keystone XL environmental assessment process vividly 
demonstrates why assessing upstream and downstream emissions from energy 
transport projects can be a costly and useless endeavor. In the end, after seven years 
of review, the State Department apparently reached this conclusion as well. In its 
final decision, the State Department confirmed its view that the project was “unlikely 
to significantly impact [oil] extraction” but said that it should be rejected anyway 
because, despite its analysis, it was “perceived as enabling” oil extraction.117 Seven 
years of review and the State Department’s best economic modeling produced a re-
sult that even the Department decided was so useless that it should be subordinated 
to contrary popular perception.118 
 
B.  Natural Gas Pipelines and Liquefied Natural Gas Exports 
 
Since 2008, hydraulic fracturing and directional drilling—commonly referred 
to as “fracking”—have transformed U.S. natural gas markets by unlocking vast re-
serves of natural gas stored in shale formations.119 This shale revolution boosted 
                                                   
115 Elana Schor, Keystone XL: Greens Fume at State’s Bet on Oil Sands as the New 
Bakken, E&E NEWS (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/special_reports/pipeline_poli-
tics/stories/1059994362 [https://perma.cc/363Q-FDDZ] (questioning “[w]hether the Gulf 
[Coast] can develop enough infrastructure to process volumes of oil sands crude comparable 
to the 700,000-plus daily barrels that [Keystone] XL would carry”). 
116 ENV’T & CLIMATE CHANGE CAN., supra note 94, at 42–43. 
117 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 9, at 12. 
118 Id.  
119 Thomas W. Merrill & David M. Schizer, The Shale Oil and Gas Revolution, Hy-
draulic Fracturing, and Water Contamination: A Regulatory Strategy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 
145, 152–64 (2013); Coleman, supra note 62, at 1364–65.  
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production, drastically lowered prices, and doubled U.S. reserves.120 The one con-
stant over this period of rapid change has been a drive for new natural gas transport 
infrastructure.121  
Unlike coal or oil, natural gas is very expensive to transport on a small scale.122 
The two main methods of moving natural gas—pipeline and ships carrying liquefied 
                                                   
120 U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Natural Gas: U.S. Natural Gas Wellhead Price, 
EIA.GOV (July 31, 2017), http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9190us3m.htm [https://perma. 
cc/5FXQ-ZHHW]. 
121 During the decade of peaking natural gas prices, the U.S. added over 20,000 miles 
of natural gas pipelines to connect expanding sources of natural gas production with natural 
gas demand. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., MAJOR CHANGES IN NATURAL GAS PIPELINE 
TRANSPORT CAPACITY 1998–2008 2 (2008), https://www.anrpl.com/documents/ANR_1_29 
_16_Rate_Case_Filing/RateCaseDocs/Exhibit%20No.%20ANR-009.pdf (“More than 
20,000 miles of new natural gas transmission pipeline, representing more than 97 billion 
cubic feet per day of capacity, were placed in service in the United States over the past 10 
years.”). That building boom has continued in the new era of natural gas abundance and is 
only likely to increase. And it is likely that the pace of pipeline building will continue as the 
nation moves from coal to natural gas for electricity and heating oil to natural gas for heating.  
U.S. Engery Info. Admin., Natural Gas Expected to Surpass Coal in Mix of Fuel Used for 
U.S. Power Generation in 2006, EIA.GOV (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/to-
dayinenergy/detail.php?id=25392 [https://perma.cc/TF7F-AY5S]; U.S. Engery Info. Ad-
min., Sulfur Content of Heating Oil to be Reduced in Northeastern States, EIA.GOV (Apr. 
18, 2012), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=5890 [https://perma.cc/3A8U-
WN6F]. In the decade of high gas prices, U.S. importers sought to build several new LNG 
import facilities. Clifford Krauss, Reversal of Fortune for U.S. Gas: After Import Plans Fiz-
zle, a Push for Exports May Fall Short, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2013, at B1. Now with shale gas 
driving U.S. prices below $3 per million BTUs, and Asian shale gas prices over $15 investors 
have submitted several applications to the Department of Energy for new LNG export facil-
ities that could ship to Asia. EY, GLOBAL LNG: WILL NEW DEMAND AND NEW SUPPLY 
MEAN NEW PRICING? 10 (2013), http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAs-
sets/Global_LNG_New_pricing_ahead/$FILE/Global_LNG_New_pricing_ahead_DW02 
40.pdf [https://perma.cc/VUC5-9NNH]. Since 1981, the global LNG trade has doubled every 
eight years. INTERNATIONAL GAS UNION: WORLD LNG REPORT 2011 7 (2012), 
http://www.igu.org/gas-knowhow/publications/igu-publications/LNG%20Report%202011. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/LLC4-4LTA]; Knut Einar Rosendahl & Eirik Lund Sagen, The Global 
Natural Gas Market: Will Transport Cost Reductions Lead to Lower Prices?, 30 ENERGY J. 
17, 17 (2009) (“Over the last decade the costs of LNG have been significantly reduced, more 
producers have entered the gas market in general and the LNG market in particular, and the 
trade between continents has increased.”). 
122 Nancy J. Forbis, The Shut-In Royalty Clause: Balancing the Interests of Lessors and 
Lessees, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1129, 1131 (1989) (“Natural gas is difficult, if not impossible, to 
store outside a reservoir, and thus producers must either transport gas to a pipeline as it is 
produced or retain it at the wellhead until they can locate a willing purchaser.”) (citations 
omitted); Mark P. Gergen, The Use of Open Terms in Contract, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 997, 
1018 n.68 (1992) (discussing economic peril for gas producer “where gas found cannot be 
sold currently because a pipeline is unavailable and the gas cannot otherwise be marketed”); 
Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Law Under Federal Energy 
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natural gas—both require billions of dollars of capital investment.123 Interstate nat-
ural gas pipelines must be designed to avoid gas leakage, and liquefaction facilities 
must cool natural gas most of the way to absolute zero until the gas turns into a liquid 
that can be transported on quarter billion dollar refrigerated ships.124 So when natural 
gas production increases in one place, there is generally more than can be used in 
the area and the local price of gas falls rapidly until new infrastructure can bring it 
to an established market in need of more gas; by the same token, when local natural 
gas demand increases, there is no quick way to bring more natural gas to the area, 
so it often creates a local price spike that will persist until new supplies can be con-
nected to the market.125 As a result, changing natural gas markets often open price 
                                                   
Price Regulation, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1473, 1518 n.169 (1981) (“Gas is not easily stored above 
ground and can be transported only by pipeline. Moreover, gas pipelines require large capital 
investments and can be justified only if the pipeline owner has secure sources of supply under 
long-term gas purchase contracts.”). 
123 See James Coleman, The Shale ‘Revolution’ Is About Gas Prices and Oil Produc-
tion, ENERGY COLLECTIVE (July 17, 2014), http://theenergycollective.com/ener-
gylawprof/432466/shale-revolution-about-gas-prices-oil-production [https://perma.cc/M3 
NE-QCRN] (“Increased production of natural gas has had a dramatic effect on natural gas 
prices because natural gas is hard to transport. If you can’t send natural gas by an existing 
pipeline to an existing market, your next best option may be to cool it into a liquid at -162 °C, 
load the liquid onto a giant, insulated, quarter-billion dollar vessel and ship it across the 
ocean, where it can be regasified and burned.”).  
124 Jacob Dweck et al., Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Litigation After the Energy Policy 
Act of 2005: State Powers in LNG Terminal Siting, 27 ENERGY L. J. 473, 473 (2006) (“Trans-
porting natural gas very long distances from gas fields located in regions of the world with 
little or nonexistent consuming markets across the oceans to large consuming markets is 
made feasible by chilling the gas to minus 260 degrees Fahrenheit, at which point the natural 
gas changes to a liquid state, reducing its volume to 1/600th that of vaporous natural gas.”). 
Absolute zero is minus 460 degrees Fahrenheit. Sarah Zielinski, Absolute Zero: Why Is a 
Negative Number Called Absolute Zero?, SMITHSONIAN.COM (Jan. 1, 2008), 
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/absolute-zero-13930448/ [https://perma.cc 
/5R5D-QXLX]. 
125 Coleman, supra note 123 (Because of the cost of shipping gas “when natural gas 
production rises, prices fall quickly because there is little use for the excess gas in the markets 
it can reach. Prices will keep falling until 1) gas is so cheap that energy users reliant on 
alternatives like coal and heating oil switch to gas, 2) gas is so cheap that it can be profitably 
liquefied and sent overseas, or 3) gas is so cheap that it’s no longer worthwhile to keep ex-
panding production.”). The U.S. government has repeatedly said that until global prices con-
verge, global liquefied natural gas transport will continue to increase. U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN., EFFECT OF INCREASED NATURAL GAS EXPORTS ON DOMESTIC ENERGY MARKETS 3 
(2012), http://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/fe/pdf/fe_lng.pdf [https://perma.cc/PNQ3-
TFQC] (“Unlike the oil market, current natural gas markets are not integrated globally. In 
today’s markets, natural gas prices span a range from $0.75 per million British thermal units 
(MMBtu) in Saudi Arabia to $4 per MMBtu in the United States and $16 per MMBtu in 
Asian markets that rely on LNG imports. Prices in European markets, which reflect a mix of 
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differentials that set off a race to build new multibillion dollar infrastructure, and 
companies that win the race can reap even greater rewards—buying gas at depressed 
prices in markets with abundant gas and selling at a premium in gas starved mar-
kets.126  
Increased natural gas transport is also crucial to meeting several of the United 
States’ domestic and international policy goals. If it can be brought to urban markets, 
natural gas can replace dirtier sources of electricity and heat such as coal and fuel 
oil.127 And liquefied natural gas exports to developing countries could help them 
move away from coal power.128 Natural gas is also a natural complement for in-
creased renewable energy; the electric grid operators must constantly balance power 
supplied and demanded, and natural gas power—unlike nuclear and coal power—
can easily be ramped up or down to compensate for fluctuations in power from in-
termittent sources like wind and solar.129 Natural gas is also often produced as a 
byproduct of oil extraction and if there are no pipelines to take it to market, it is 
simply burned off (a process known as “flaring”), wasting the gas while releasing 
carbon dioxide into the atmosphere.130 Conversely, if there were strong markets for 
natural gas, extraction and transport companies would have stronger incentives to 
avoid leakage and flaring as their product grew more valuable. 
Many environmental groups strongly oppose increased natural gas transport for 
a related reason: they agree that increased transport will encourage use of natural 
gas but they want to stop all fossil fuel use as quickly as possible rather than starting 
a transition from coal to gas.131 As a result, they are pushing the federal government 
                                                   
spot prices and contract prices with some indexation to oil, fall between U.S and Asian 
prices.”). 
126 See James Coleman et al., Calibrating Liquefied Natural Gas Export Life Cycle 
Analysis: Accounting for Legal Boundaries and Post-Export Markets, CAN. INST. RE-
SOURCES L., May 2015, at 1, 7–11 (describing all the liquefied natural gas projects looking 
to profit on gas price differentials between Canada and Asian markets where gas is expen-
sive). 
127 See Union of Concerned Scientists, Environmental Impacts of Natural Gas, 
http://www.ucsusa.org/clean-energy/coal-and-other-fossil-fuels/environmental-impacts-of-
natural-gas#.WYEw_xiZORs [https://perma.cc/V9BU-5L2Q] (last visited Aug. 5, 2017). 
128 James Coleman & Sarah Marie Jordaan, Clearing the Air: How Canadian Liquefied 
Natural Gas Exports Could Help the World Meet Its Climate Goals, C.D. HOWE INST., Aug. 
24, 2016, at 2.  
129 Id. at 2 (“Unlike solar and wind power, natural gas plants can be run at any time on 
demand. Such plants even work well with solar and wind because they are easy to ramp up 
or down to match power demand by supplementing the intermittent power these renewable 
sources provide.”). 
130 See Klass & Meinhardt, supra note 73, at 1009–15 (describing extensive flaring in 
North Dakota as a result of lack of transport options to bring natural gas to markets in need 
of gas). 
131 Hannah Northey, LNG: Democrats Face Tricky Balancing Act as Export Debate 
Grows Louder, E&E NEWS (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059992926 
[https://perma.cc/V49Z-TYMQ]. 
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to expand environmental assessments for new liquefied natural gas facilities and in-
terstate pipelines to consider how those transport facilities will encourage natural 
gas production and consumption.132  
Downstream emissions from liquefied natural gas facilities are difficult to as-
sess because the net impact of natural gas exports depends on what sources of power 
gas displaces in importing countries—that is, what power sources will other coun-
tries forgo if they have the opportunity to import natural gas that they can burn for 
electricity?133 This question is hard to answer for two related reasons. First, liquefied 
natural gas facilities are so expensive that they are only worthwhile if they can be 
used for several decades; energy markets may change dramatically over this 
timespan so it is difficult to tell what countries will eventually import liquefied nat-
ural gas from a facility that is built today.134 Second, it is hard to know what alter-
native sources of energy these natural gas exports will displace in importing coun-
tries.135 If gas is used to replace dirtier sources, like coal, it may reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions in importing countries; but if it is used to phase out nuclear power, or 
delay a transition to renewable power, it could raise greenhouse gas emissions in 
importing countries.136 
On the other hand, it could be easier to assess the upstream consequences of 
natural gas transport projects on natural gas production in the United States. In fact, 
the case for considering upstream impacts of natural gas transport is stronger than 
the case for considering upstream impacts of oil pipelines like Keystone XL. First, 
because it is more expensive to transport gas, it is somewhat easier to estimate how 
                                                   
132 See Amy Harder, Are Natural-Gas Exports the Next Keystone?, WALL ST. J. (May 
18, 2014), https://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/03/18/are-natural-gas-exports-next-key-
stone/ [https://perma.cc/RMG8-8FKE]; Flyer, supra note 25, at 307–13 (arguing that FERC 
must consider upstream and downstream impacts in natural gas pipeline and liquefied natural 
gas facility approvals). 
133 See Coleman & Jordaan, supra note 128, at 2 (presenting a life cycle analysis of 
greenhouse gas emission from liquefied natural gas production, export, and combustion, and 
showing why “assessing the downstream emissions of a particular LNG project is impractical 
because it is difficult to predict where the LNG will be sent”). 
134 Id. at 6 (“The full impact of an individual facility on global emissions is nearly 
impossible to estimate unless regulators know where the LNG will be sent when they ap-
prove a project, or how evolving market conditions may change the original estimation of 
the impact.”).  
135 Id. at 2–3 (“LNG might displace either coal or low-GHG sources; . . . natural gas 
plants are ideally suited to replace coal plants, and . . . might actually facilitate an expansion 
of renewable sources such as solar and wind by being able to ramp up or down to complement 
these renewable sources’ intermittent output. Countries could also use natural gas as a crutch 
to help them phase out nuclear power. Alternatively, they could use natural gas, rather than 
expanding renewables, to meet new demand or replace old facilities.”). 
136 Id. at 5. 
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a single new transport facility impacts gas production.137 If an oil pipeline is not 
approved, there are still many options for moving the oil to market such as tank cars 
by rail or barges by rivers.138 In contrast, gas is hard to transport, so there may be 
situations where producers will not invest in natural gas production if there is no 
clear way to bring the product to market.139 Second, most of the new natural gas 
production that supplies liquefied natural gas export projects is in the United States, 
so U.S. review of these upstream markets would arguably be more appropriate than 
U.S. review of energy markets in other countries.140 Third, run of the mill interstate 
natural gas pipelines, unlike oil pipelines, are already subject to a federal rather than 
state review: they must obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity from 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.141 
Nevertheless, the U.S. government has thus far resisted considering how new 
pipelines and liquefied natural gas facilities will affect natural gas production and 
consumption.142 The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has approved eleven 
of fourteen proposed liquefaction facilities and 154 pipeline applications since 
2009.143 Yet FERC has resisted all calls to consider the environmental impact of 
                                                   
137 Dawn Russell et al., The Real Impact of High Transportation Costs, CSCMP’S SUP-
PLY CHAIN Q. (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.supplychainquarterly.com/topics/Logis-
tics/20140311-the-real-impact-of-high-transportation-costs/ [https://perma.cc/6WRS-
9P7D]. 
138 Both of these modes of oil transportation have expanded rapidly with increased oil 
production from tight oil formations in the United States. Julie M. Carey, Rail Emerging as 
Long-term North American Crude Option, OIL & GAS J. (Aug. 5, 2013), 
http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-111/issue-8/transportation/rail-emerging-as-
long-term-north-american.html [https://perma.cc/JQ53-C8EG] (discussing increased 
transport “by pipeline, rail, and barge”). 
139 ROBIN BATES & NEIL FRASER, INVESTMENT DECISIONS IN THE NATIONALISED FUEL 
INDUSTRIES 138–76 (1974).  
140 Of course, as a matter of policy it may be wiser to leave some of these decisions to 
the states rather than allowing the federal government to set natural gas production policy. 
See infra Part IV. 
141 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c)(1)(A) (2010) (forbidding interstate transport of natural gas with-
out a “a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the Commission authoriz-
ing such acts or operations”). 
142 See FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR THE SABINE 
PASS LIQUEFACTION PROJECT 2-99–2-100 (2011), http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/EA-
1845-FEA-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/83S8-UMWU]. FERC has exclusive authority to ap-
prove or deny siting, construction, and operation of liquefied natural gas facilities. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 717b(e)(1) (2005) (“The Commission shall have the exclusive authority to approve or deny 
an application for the siting, construction, expansion, or operation of an LNG terminal.”). 
143 The Department of Energy has approved 18 of these projects and is reviewing 38 
more. LONG TERM APPLICATIONS RECEIVED BY DOE/FE TO EXPORT DOMESTICALLY PRO-
DUCED LNG FROM THE LOWER-48 STATES (AS OF MARCH 18, 2016) 1–6 (2016), http://en-
ergy.gov/sites/prod/files/2016/03/f30/Summary%20of%20LNG%20Export%20Applica-
tions.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8UR-4CSH]. 
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increased natural gas production enabled by these new transport facilities.144 During 
the Obama Administration, this led to increasingly high profile interagency conflicts 
with the Environmental Protection Agency, which believes that FERC should pro-
vide full reviews of the upstream and downstream impacts of natural gas projects.145 
FERC’s reluctance to consider upstream and downstream emissions related to 
new natural gas transport projects, however, may be little comfort to investors pur-
suing multibillion dollar, multidecade projects.146 After all, the rules of the Keystone 
XL review changed in the middle of the environmental assessment process and 
FERC has never explained why the reasoning applied in that case might not be ap-
plied to natural gas projects. The most realistic rationale may be that while President 
Obama repeatedly indicated that he was skeptical of Canadian oil,147 the government 
did, at times, champion the U.S. natural gas industry.148 
                                                   
144 See Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 827 F.3d 59, 63 (D.C. Cir. 
2016); Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 827 F.3d 36, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2016); S. 
Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 621 F.3d 1085, 1089–
90 (9th Cir. 2010); Burger & Wentz, supra note 17, at 137 (“FERC has consistently main-
tained that it has no obligation to consider greenhouse emissions or any other environmental 
effects associated with upstream and downstream activities in the natural gas production and 
supply chain.”). 
145 Letter from U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 50, at 2 (stating FERC’s environ-
mental review “perpetuates the significant emission” by not considering downstream impact 
and so “[w]e . . . request a headquarters level meeting with us to seek a definitive resolution 
to this matter before you [approve the pipelines] and so that you do not continue to take this 
approach in additional NEPA documents”); Letter from U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 
64, at 2–6 (on file with author) (FERC’s environmental reviews of liquefied natural gas ter-
minals must add assessment of “emissions associated with the production, transport, and 
combustion of the natural gas”). FERC’s position has generally been supported by the other 
infrastructure and production approving agencies, such as the Army Corps of Engineers and 
the Bureau of Ocean and Energy Management. See BUREAU OF OCEAN & ENERGY MGMT., 
supra note 67, at 8–37 (rejecting consideration of upstream and downstream impacts for oil 
leases); Coleman & Jordaan, supra note 128, at 2–6. 
146 James W. Coleman, Energy Market and Policy Revolutions: Regulatory Process 
and the Cost of Capital, in ENERGY LAW AND ECONOMICS (Klaus Mathis ed., forthcoming 
Springer 2017). 
147 President Obama repeatedly responded to complaints from pipeline supporters by 
admonishing them to remember “this is Canadian oil, this isn’t U.S. oil.” Transcript: Presi-
dent Obama’s Nov. 5 News Conference on Midterm Election Results, WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/transcript-president-obamas-remarks-on-
midterm-election-results/2014/11/05/491a02b2-6524-11e4-9fdc-d43b053ecb4d_story.html 
?utm_term=.71d0106e1537 [https://perma.cc/2QXX-XPSQ]; see also Kessler, supra note 
74 (“I’ve already said I’m happy to look at how we can increase pipeline production for U.S. 
oil, but Keystone is for Canadian oil to send that down to the Gulf.”). 
148 Denise Garcia, A ‘Real’ Natural Gas Revolution in the US: Moniz, CNBC (Feb. 24, 
2016), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/02/24/a-real-natural-gas-revolution-in-the-us-moniz. 
html [https://perma.cc/GZ98-JML3] (United States Secretary of Energy Moniz praising U.S. 
potential to be a major natural gas producer and exporter). 
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Yet if the procedural requirements for transport project assessments depend on 
the political winds, there are some preliminary signs that natural gas may no longer 
have those winds at its back. The Obama administration’s final climate plan for U.S. 
electricity production sharply cut back on the role that it envisioned for natural gas 
in the future U.S. electricity mix.149 The United States has also begun to crack down 
on methane emissions from natural gas production.150 And, in a shock to many, the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission recently rejected a natural gas pipeline de-
signed to serve an Oregon liquefied natural gas facility on the basis that there was 
no need for the facility—effectively killing the facility itself, which it had approved 
in an earlier decision.151 At the same time, state governments have pushed for a 
larger role in assessing natural gas projects and the Environmental Protection 
Agency and environmental groups have continued their lobbying for expanded en-
vironmental assessments.152  
Finally, on February 3, 2017, an outgoing commissioner of FERC, Norman 
Bay, effectively endorsed these outside arguments for wider environmental assess-
ments.153 This argument came in a separate statement to an otherwise uncontrover-
sial pipeline approval.154 Commissioner Bay continued to insist that NEPA does not 
require FERC to assess upstream and downstream emissions from gas pipelines, 
noting that “FERC has no authority to regulate the production of natural gas” be-
cause “in general, that authority resides with the states.”155 Nevertheless, “in light of 
the heightened public interest and in the interests of good government,” Commis-
sioner Bay believed that the Commission should begin studying the impacts of in-
creased upstream emissions and the downstream impact of natural gas.156 Thus, nat-
ural gas transport projects may well be the next industry to experience expanded 
environmental assessments. 
 
                                                   
149 Barry Jopson, Shale Gas Is Loser in Obama Climate Plan, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 3, 
2015), https://www.ft.com/content/19ec1de4-39fa-11e5-8613-07d16aad2152 [https://perma 
.cc/6SSS-FDMX]. 
150 Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New and Modified Sources, 80 
Fed. Reg. 56,593 (Sept. 18, 2015). The Trump administration’s attempts to delay enforce-
ment of these standards were rejected by the D.C. Circuit. Clean Air Council v. Pruitt, 862 
F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2017).  
151 U.S. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Order Denying Applications for Certificate 
and Section 3 Authorization, 154 FERC ¶ 61,190 (Mar. 11, 2016); see also U.S. Rejects 
Multibillion-Dollar Jordan Cove Gas Export Plan, BUNKER PORTS NEWS WORLDWIDE 
(Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.bunkerportsnews.com/News.aspx?ElementID=c44f8870-6cb7-
4b3b-95f6-19c2d9bcdfe3 [https://perma.cc/34V3-VLEJ] (noting that “little or no evidence 
of the need” for the pipeline was shown).  
152 Coleman, supra note 62, at 1367. 
153 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm., Order Granting Abandonment and Issuing Certificates, 
158 FERC ¶ 61,145 (Feb. 3, 2017). 
154 Id.  
155 Id.  
156 Id.  
 
2018] BEYOND THE PIPELINE WARS 153 
 
C.  Coal Exports 
 
Environmental reviews of coal export facilities have been just as inconsistent 
and contentious as reviews of oil and gas transport. Despite the association of coal 
production with eastern states like West Virginia, the leading coal producing state is 
Wyoming and nearly half of U.S. coal production is from the Powder River Basin 
in Wyoming and Montana.157 As a result of declining domestic use, coal producers 
are looking to export this coal to Asian markets that keep demanding more coal.158 
This requires port terminals for coal export: the two most prominent proposals are 
the Millennium Bulk Logistics Longview Terminal in Longview, Washington and 
the “Gateway Pacific Terminal” at Cherry Point near Ferndale, Washington.159 The 
Army Corps, which approves these facilities, has said that its environmental review 
will not consider the environmental impact of “burning of coal overseas” because 
those events are “outside the Corps’ control and responsibility.”160  
The State of Washington, however, is performing its own environmental as-
sessment of the Longview Terminal, which does consider the greenhouse gas emis-
sions from “end-use coal combustion.”161 Thus the Longview Terminal creates an 
anomalous situation in which a U.S. state, but not the federal government, is focus-
ing its environmental review on energy markets in other countries. If federal envi-
ronmental reviews should avoid asserting the power to control consumption in other 
                                                   
157 U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Frequently Asked Questions: Which States Produce the 
Most Coal?, EIA.GOV, https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=69&t=2 [https://perma.cc 
/4JFE-YJ2B] (last updated Feb. 28, 2017). 
158 Coleman, supra note 62, at 1366, n.49. 
159 U.S. Energy Abundance: Regulatory, Market, and Legal Barriers to Export: Hear-
ing Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Power of the Committee on Energy and Com-
merce, House of Representatives, 113th Cong. 9-21 (2013) (statement of Jennifer Moyer, 
Acting Chief, Regulatory Program, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers). At one time, there were 
more coal export facilities planned from terminals in Washington and Oregon, but many of 
these projects have been shelved. Scott Learn, Port of Coos Bay Coal-Export Proposal Ends 
After 18 Months of Work, OREGONIAN (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.oregonlive.com/environ-
ment/index.ssf/2013/04/port_of_coos_bay_coal-export_p.html [https://perma.cc/PNW6-
LA62]; Kim Murphy, Plans Shelved for Coal Export Terminal in Oregon, L.A. TIMES (May 
8, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/08/nation/la-na-nn-coal-export-oregon-
20130508 [https://perma.cc/FYT5-Q8DK]; The Associated Press, Rail Company Shelving 
Coal Export Plans for Hoquiam Port, SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 14, 2012), https://www.seat-
tletimes.com/seattle-news/company-shelves-hoquiam-coal-export-plan/ [https://perma.cc 
/FN6E-THZU]. 
160 Moyer, supra note 159, at 10. 
161 WASH. STATE DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT S-
9 (2016), http://www.millenniumbulkeiswa.gov/assets/00_mbtl_sepa_deis_ch00_summary 
_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/582E-2KBR] (“Climate change concerns included impacts as a 
result of combustion of fossil fuels at coal power plants overseas . . . .”); Millenium Bulk 
Terminals-Longview, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.millenniumbulkeiswa.gov 
/frequently-asked-questions.html [https://perma.cc/4HYF-F383] (last visited Aug. 5, 2017). 
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countries,162 then presumably the same principle should apply a fortiori to state en-
vironmental reviews. On the other hand, Washington will not consider local envi-
ronmental impacts in Asia from burning coal shipped from Longview Terminal, pre-
sumably because those air impacts have only a minimal impact on Washington air 
quality.163 
Coal exports might seem like the easiest case for reviewing the downstream 
impact of an energy transport project. Coal combustion produces more carbon diox-
ide pollution than any other fuel used in the United States,164 so encouraging more 
coal combustion might seem like an unmitigated environmental bad. The counterar-
guments of the coal industry, however, illustrate how difficult it can be to assess the 
downstream impacts of energy transport.165   
First, the coal industry argues that U.S. coal exports will not increase global 
consumption of solid fuels—instead, they will simply replace other solid fuels.166 
Second, it argues that importing countries will use low sulfur, high efficiency U.S. 
coal to replace low grade domestic coal that burns even dirtier.167 Third, it argues 
that, in some countries, citizens must rely on burning biomass such as wood and 
animal dung for heat, which produces more air pollution than any kind of coal, mak-
ing U.S. exports an environmental boon.168 Of course, environmental groups contest 
each of these points, and also note that cheap U.S. coal exports delay a transition to 
                                                   
162 Exec. Order No. 12114, 44 Fed. Reg. 1957 (Jan. 4, 1979) (limiting environmental 
review of U.S. exports used abroad to consideration of “a product, or physical project pro-
ducing a principal product or an emission or effluent, which is prohibited or strictly regulated 
by Federal law in the United States because its toxic effects on the environment create a 
serious public health risk.”). 
163 Millenium Bulk, supra note 161 (“The analysis does NOT include evaluating envi-
ronmental impacts within any country importing the coal.”). Greenhouse gas emissions have 
the same climate impact regardless of whether the coal is burned in the United States or 
across the globe in Asian countries importing U.S. coal. But even conventional pollutants 
such as particulate matter are increasingly reaching the United States from sources across the 
Pacific Ocean in China. See M. Huang et al., Impacts of Transported Background Pollutants 
on Summertime Western US Air Quality: Model Evaluation, Sensitivity Analysis and Data 
Assimilation, 13 ATMOSPHERIC CHEMISTRY & PHYSICS 359, 360 (2013). 
164 A. R. Brandt et al., Methane Leaks from North American Natural Gas Systems, 343 
SCIENCE 733, 733–35 (2014); U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Frequently Asked Questions: How 
Much Carbon Dioxide Is Produced When Different Fuels Are Burned?, EIA.GOV, 
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=73&t=11 [https://perma.cc/C7SR-SGVQ] (last 
updated June 8, 2017). 
165 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COAL: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TO SUPPORT NA-
TIONAL ENERGY POLICY 4–5 (2007).  
166 See Lisa Palmer, Facing Tough Market at Home, U.S. Coal Giant Pushes Overseas, 
YALE ENV’T 360 (July 29, 2013), http://e360.yale.edu/feature/facing_tough_mar-
ket_coal_giant_peabody_energy_pushes_overseas/2676/ [https://perma.cc/RW5A-NG8Z].  
167 Id.  
168 UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, GEO YEAR BOOK 2006 44–46 (2006). 
 
2018] BEYOND THE PIPELINE WARS 155 
 
cleaner fuels that would improve the environment in importing countries.169 But the 
coal industry arguments demonstrate how complex and contested any environmental 
review of downstream impacts of energy transport facilities would eventually be-
come. 
 
D.  Electricity Transmission 
 
If the United States is to meet its goals for transforming the power sector, it will 
require a massive and expensive build out of electricity transmission. One tenth of 
all capital investment in the United States goes to the power industry.170 The U.S. 
electric grid is worth nearly a trillion dollars171 and will require another trillion dol-
lars of investment merely to maintain the current level of service.172 Expanding wind 
and solar power will require further ramping up of this investment. For one, wind 
and solar power is often strongest in desert and prairie regions far from urban de-
mand.173 For another, wind and solar power are not dispatchable sources of electric-
ity—that is, they cannot operate on demand but only provide power when the wind 
is blowing or the sun shining—so they may require extra interregional transmission 
to make up for local weather anomalies.174 
                                                   
169 Michael B. McElroy & Xi Lu, Fracking’s Future: Natural Gas, the Economy, and 
America’s Energy Prospects, HARVARD MAG., http://harvardmagazine.com/2013/01/frack-
ings-future [https://perma.cc/ZJZ2-3FNS] (last visited Aug. 5, 2017). 
170 DANIEL YERGIN, THE QUEST: ENERGY, SECURITY AND THE REMAKING OF THE MOD-
ERN WORLD 398 (2011) (“Electric power is a classically long-term business. A power plant 
built today may be operating 60 to 70 years from now. It is also a big-ticket business—in 
fact, it is the most capital-intensive major industry in the United States. Fully 10 percent of 
all capital investment in the United States is embedded in the power plants, transmission 
lines, substations, poles, and wires that altogether make up the power infrastructure.”). 
171 Alexandra B. Klass & Jim Rossi, Revitalizing Dormant Commerce Clause Review 
for Interstate Coordination, 100 MINN. L. REV. 129, 140–41 (2015) (“The U.S. electric grid 
constitutes an $876 billion asset managed by over 3,000 utilities serving nearly 300 million 
customers.”). 
172 Id. at 142 (“[I]n order to maintain even current levels of grid reliability, the electric 
industry must make . . . investments in transmission and distribution alone of nearly $900 
billion.”). 
173 Ashley C. Brown & Jim Rossi, Siting Transmission Lines in a Changed Milieu: 
Evolving Notions of the “Public Interest” in Balancing State and Regional Considerations, 
81 U. COLO. L. REV. 705, 711 (2010). This sort of long distance directional power transfer 
is encouraging a transition to a direct current model for power transmission instead of the 
regular two way alternating current. Alexandra B. Klass, Takings and Transmission, 91 N.C. 
L. REV. 1079, 111 n.196 (2013) (“Today, new, high-voltage DC (‘HVDC’) lines are often 
proposed as the most efficient and economical method of transporting wind power long dis-
tances.”). 
174 Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, 2014 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1, 44–52 (2014). 
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Such massive capital investments are particularly vulnerable to the kind of un-
certainty created by shifting rules of environmental assessment.175 Of course, it 
might seem that transmission presents the happy flip side of the contentious debates 
over fossil fuel transport. After all, new transmission lines could benefit the renew-
able industry upstream and could clean the air downstream by replacing dirtier 
sources such as coal plants that are often located near urban centers.176 Indeed, the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has mandated that when states make trans-
mission decisions they must consider how their decisions will impact the ability of 
neighboring states to meet their renewable targets.177  
But there is no reason to think that electric transmission will be uniquely im-
mune from the uncertainties and delay caused by expanded and uncertain environ-
mental assessments. First of all, power transmission has historically attracted more 
opposition than oil and gas pipelines because transmission is above the ground, leav-
ing a permanent eyesore.178 Second, the renewable projects themselves often attract 
local opposition driven by the effects of large solar and wind facilities on sensitive 
species, local land use, and aesthetic values.179 These opponents of wind and solar 
projects will use the same tactics employed in pipeline debates: even a project that 
                                                   
175 M.S. Reed et al., Combining Analytical Frameworks to Assess Livelihood Vulnera-
bility to Climate Change and Analyse Adaptation Options, 94 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 66, 68–
69 (2013). 
176 Coleman, supra note 62, at 1378 (“For example, a transmission line from in-state 
windmills to out-of-state consumers could also provide those consumers with cleaner air if 
it displaced local coal power.”). 
177 Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating 
Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49842-01 (Aug. 11, 2011). States making decisions about siting 
power generation facilities must consider likely transmission decisions in other states. See 
Uma Outka, Environmental Law and Fossil Fuels: Barriers to Renewable Energy, 65 VAND. 
L. REV. 1679, 1692 n.45 (2012); Amy L. Stein, The Tipping Point of Federalism, 45 CONN. 
L. REV. 217, 245–46 (2012) (exploring the disparity between electricity generation siting 
which nominally remains in state control and siting regimes governing electricity and natural 
gas transmission). 
178 Lita Furby et al., Public Perceptions of Electric Power Transmission Lines, 8 J. 
ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 19, 20 (1988) (“Transmission lines currently represent a problem area in 
the electric power system: they require considerable land for their corridors, and the use of 
that land for transmission lines may conflict with other land use practices or plans; they cause 
noise; they are perceived as visually unattractive; and they are perceived to cause health 
problems and safety risks for both animals and humans. As a result, high-voltage transmis-
sion lines have recently met a very significant amount of public opposition. . . . Opposition 
to transmission line siting and construction has sometimes caused enormous costs to the util-
ities, through long delays in gaining regulatory approval, litigation fees, and occasionally 
even vandalism.”). 
179 Patrick Devine-Wright, Reconsidering Public Attitudes and Public Acceptance of 
Renewable Energy Technologies: A Critical Review 3 (Econ. & Social Research Council, 
Working Paper No. 1.4, 2007), http://geography.exeter.ac.uk/beyond_nimbyism/delivera-
bles/bn_wp1_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RB9-57SY] (discussing “widespread local opposition 
towards renewable energy developments, particularly wind and biomass.”). 
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has received site approvals will never be built if it cannot connect to centers of de-
mand.180 With an expanded environmental impact assessment, the transmission ap-
proval process will provide another opportunity to relitigate familiar disputes that 
wind turbines endanger bird populations and damage scenic vistas or that solar farms 
have impacts on water use, land use, and endangered species.181  
Transmission opponents can and will add arguments that all the downstream 
economic activity that is served by electricity has negative impacts on the environ-
ment, or that the power transmission, which is open to all users, will be diverted to 
serve fossil fuel power plants.182 And the arguments for considering upstream and 
downstream consequences of electricity transmission are, if anything, more reason-
able than the same case for oil pipelines: oil can go by rail, ship, or pipeline; electric 
power can only go by transmission lines.183 Thus, renewable power is, if anything, 
more vulnerable than oil production to delay by environmental review of transport 
tactics. 
 
IV.  U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEWS OF FOREIGN ENERGY MARKETS ENCROACH 
ON THE JURISDICTION OF ITS ENERGY TRADING PARTNERS 
 
Environmental reviews of domestic energy transport infrastructure contain an 
awkward implication when they focus on how that infrastructure will impact global 
markets: if the United States rejects or approves a pipeline or a liquefied natural gas 
facility because it will change foreign energy markets, then the United States is, by 
implication, asserting the power and the right to alter energy markets in another 
country. Of course, from a fully realist perspective, any regulatory approval, or any 
                                                   
180 David Brooks, What Does the Quick Approval of a Vermont Power Line Say about 
Northern Pass?, CONCORD MONITOR (Jan. 8, 2016), http://www.concordmonitor.com/Ar-
chive/2016/01/vermontElectricity-cm-010816 [https://perma.cc/3Z36-4EQC] (noting that 
environmental groups oppose transmission to bring hydropower into New England because 
“reservoirs displaced native peoples and swamped ecosystems covering hundreds of square 
miles, including an infamous 1984 drowning of some 10,000 caribou during a water release 
from a dam.”). 
181 Bird Conservation Group Challenges Feds over Wind Farm Eagle Deaths, FOX 
NEWS (May 2, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/05/02/bird-conservation-
group-challenges-feds-over-wind-farm-eagle-deaths.html [https://perma.cc/R4Q3-XSQ2]; 
Todd Woody, Solar Energy Faces Tests on Greenness, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/24/business/energy-environment/24solar.html 
[https://perma.cc/S9YJ-7ELY]. 
182 Adam Orford, Power to the People: Primer on NEPA and Transmission Lines, 29 
NAT. GAS & ELECTRICITY 16, 21 (2013) (“Perhaps most commonly, today’s transmission 
opponents may argue that the agency should review and disclose the impacts of induced 
energy generation as an ‘indirect effect.”). 
183 U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Electricity Explained: How Electricity Is Delivered to 
Consumers, EIC.GOV, https://www.eia.gov/Energyexplained/index.cfm?page=electric-
ity_delivery [https://perma.cc/K2AQ-QCGT] (last updated Aug. 31, 2017). 
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regulation, may have an impact on global markets because supply and demand dis-
perses price signals across international borders.184 What is different about upstream 
and downstream environmental reviews of energy transport is that they explicitly 
purport to measure how a U.S. government action will affect its trading partners and 
then make that effect a basis for the United States’ decision.185 This assertion is an 
unusually explicit encroachment on U.S. trading partners’ authority to achieve a bal-
ance between environmental and economic concerns in regulating their own energy 
markets.  
Of course, the United States has an unusually strong interest in greenhouse gas 
emissions abroad because these gases are well mixed in the atmosphere so that, un-
like conventional pollutants, emissions abroad cause just as much harm as domestic 
emissions.186 And perhaps countries around the world will move to new models of 
sovereignty and trade law that recognize some kind of shared jurisdiction to monitor 
and discourage greenhouse gas emissions associated with domestic industries. But 
for now, while nations have proven willing to pledge domestic action to meet global 
climate goals, they have continued to assert their fundamental authority to choose 
how to regulate their domestic energy industries and how much to sacrifice to help 
the world limit climate change.187 
                                                   
184 A famous example of this is the “California effect” in which global manufactures 
upgrade a product to ensure that it will meet standards developed in a high regulation state 
like California. DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULA-
TION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 248 (1995) (using the term “California effect” to describe how 
California’s regulatory innovation has spread to other states through national trade); see also 
Coleman, supra note 62, at 1359–60 n.8 (distinguishing such regulations, which merely have 
an incidental effect on other jurisdictions, from those that explicitly regulate production 
methods in other jurisdictions). 
185 Coleman, supra note 62, at 1385–86 n.169. Of course, merely studying greenhouse 
gas emissions in other countries need not encroach on other countries’ jurisdiction, if U.S. 
regulators never made a decision on the basis of such studies. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power 
Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) (“NEPA does set forth sig-
nificant substantive goals for the Nation, but its mandate to the agencies is essentially pro-
cedural.”) (citations omitted). But if these analyses would never tip the balance on a project 
approval, then they should not be part of an environmental impact statement under the Su-
preme Court’s interpretation of NEPA. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 767–
68 (2004). 
186 COMMITTEE ON THE SCI. OF CLIMATE CHANGE, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLI-
MATE CHANGE SCIENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOME KEY QUESTIONS 10–11 (2001); James W. 
Coleman, Unilateral Climate Regulation, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 87, 107–08 (2014) (de-
scribing why climate regulators must take particular care that their regulations avoid encour-
aging carbon emissions overseas). This aspect of the carbon problem does suggest that up-
stream reviews of greenhouse gas emissions in other jurisdictions are less unreasonable than 
upstream review of other foreign pollution. 
187 Coleman, supra note 186, at 104–05 n.72 (describing persistent disagreement be-
tween countries on how much each country should control its emissions). Under current trade 
law, nations may not attach conditions to domestic sales that attempt to control the “process 
and production methods” of their trading partners—that is, countries generally cannot use 
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If U.S. trading partners believe that they should be able to choose their own 
energy policies, how will they react to U.S. assertions that it can choose for them? 
Consider the former President’s statements on the Keystone XL pipeline: he directed 
the State Department to reject the pipeline if it encouraged Canadian oil produc-
tion,188 emphasizing that he would encourage American oil production instead.189 
This will end in trade wars: if the Keystone XL precedent is applied to all energy 
transport reviews, the result will be regular official policy statements of the U.S. 
government that reject energy export facilities on the stated basis that these rejec-
tions will help slow manufacturing in China, natural gas power in Europe, and coal 
power production in the developing world. Needless to say, these are interests that 
each of these other countries feel are vital to their economic and physical security. 
Although some nationalists and environmentalists may consider trade wars to be a 
benefit,190 it would seem perverse for the National Environmental Policy Act to be-
come a catalyst for such global friction.191 
This is not to say that the United States should not be concerned with environ-
mental policies abroad. There are several avenues for influencing environmental 
regulation in U.S. trading partners such as diplomacy, multilateral agreements like 
the Montreal Protocol,192 and multilateral bodies such as the Commission for Envi-
ronmental Cooperation.193 The question is whether asserting the power and the au-
thority to unilaterally alter energy markets in other countries through environmental 
                                                   
import restrictions to encourage other countries to move to favored modes of production—
unless these conditions are deemed both environmentally justified and procedurally fair to 
producing countries. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. I, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 
A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194; Steve Charnovitz, The Law of Environmental PPMs in the WTO: 
Debunking the Myth of Illegality, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 59, 101-02 (2002). 
188 See supra text accompanying note 58. 
189 Kessler, supra note 74 (“I’ve already said I’m happy to look at how we can increase 
pipeline production for U.S. oil, but Keystone is for Canadian oil to send that down to the 
Gulf.”). 
190 Daniel C. Esty, Bridging the Trade-Environment Divide, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 113, 
116 (2001) (“Certain environmentalists will always be opposed to trade liberalization be-
cause they adhere to a ‘limits to growth’ philosophy.”). 
191 Note that this focus on foreign emissions is the opposite of normal consideration of 
environmental effects abroad, which often look at how domestic emissions might hurt people 
in foreign countries. 42 U.S.C. § 7415(a) (2017) (allowing regulation if “any air pollutant or 
pollutants emitted in the United States cause or contribute to air pollution which may rea-
sonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare in a foreign country”). 
192 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S. 
Treaty Doc. NO. 100-10, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3. 
193 Created by the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, a side 
treaty to the North American Free Trade Agreement, the Commission for Environmental 
Cooperation monitors environmental regulation in Canada, the United States, and Mexico. 
COMMISION FOR ENV. COOPERATION, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2014), 
http://www.cec.org/sites/default/files/documents/annual_reports/annual-report-2013-en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2UNZ-ESYF]. 
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reviews of transport infrastructure is a useful addition to those other methods of in-
fluencing environmental regulation abroad. 
Ultimately, this assertion is an undiplomatic invitation to conflict in energy 
trade.194 As the State Department’s review of the Keystone XL pipeline made plain, 
even the most thorough and well intentioned review of the foreign impacts of a do-
mestic pipeline results in tenuous and contested conclusions. The best modeling still 
requires innumerable assumptions and estimations, each of which could easily be 
contested in a conflict between trading partners.195 And if countries began shading 
their reviews in service of their domestic industries, the complexity of these assess-
ments could be a cloak for protectionism. 
There are some preliminary indications that jurisdictions do choose assump-
tions and estimations that will cast their domestic industry in a favorable light.196 
The most common trick is to assume that domestic exports of fossil fuels will replace 
even dirtier fossil fuels abroad. For example, U.S. officials, including Secretary of 
Energy Ernest Moniz, have consistently asserted that liquefied natural gas from the 
United States will lower global greenhouse gas emissions by replacing coal com-
bustion in other countries.197 This is not an unreasonable position: coal dominates 
electricity production in many countries that are looking to import more liquefied 
natural gas, and natural gas is a good replacement for coal because, unlike wind and 
solar power, it is a reliable source of electricity.198 But environmental groups op-
posed to gas exports have a reasonable response: when countries install new electric 
generation capacity, they are more likely to choose cleaner sources such as solar and 
wind, so natural gas imports are delaying a transition to cleaner renewable 
sources.199 So far, U.S. regulators seem to be ignoring this response: the Department 
                                                   
194 This is even truer when, as in Washington State’s review of the Millenium Longview 
terminal, a U.S. state asserts that it should be able to review the consequences of allowing 
increased coal use in the nation’s sovereign energy trading partners. WASH. STATE DEP’T OF 
ECOLOGY, supra note 161, at S-9 (“Climate change concerns included impacts as a result of 
combustion of fossil fuels at coal power plants overseas.”). 
195 The U.S. government’s decision on Keystone XL has been challenged by TransCan-
ada on exactly these grounds as discrimination and expropriation in violation of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement. Ian Austen, TransCanada Seeks $15 Billion from U.S. 
over Keystone XL Pipeline, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2016), https://www.ny-
times.com/2016/01/07/business/international/transcanada-to-sue-us-for-blocking-keystone-
xl-pipeline.html [https://perma.cc/DKR3-2UAY]; James W. Coleman, TransCanada Sues 
U.S. Government for Rejecting Keystone XL Pipeline, ENERGY LAW PROFESSOR (Jan. 9, 
2016), http://www.energylawprof.com/?p=691 [https://perma.cc/2T2J-E6WY]. 
196 See Ken Silverstein, Energy Secretary Moniz Signals LNG Exports Will Soon Get 
Moving, FORBES (June 15, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kensilver-
stein/2013/06/15/energy-secretary-moniz-signals-lng-exports-will-soon-get-moving/#7c6b 
0a1a2af9 [https://perma.cc/GY2T-XCUE]. 
197 Id. 
198 Coleman & Jordaan, supra note 128, at 4–5. 
199 Id.; China Delivers Global Record Wind and Solar Installs While National Coal 
Consumption Drops, INST. FOR ENERGY ECON. & FIN. ANALYSIS (Feb. 29, 2016), 
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of Energy’s principal study on the downstream impact of gas exports only compared 
gas exports to other fossil fuels such as coal.200 
In fact, the United States has been as creative and effective as any industry trade 
group in promoting plausible but controversial theories for how its fossil fuel exports 
are uniquely suited to cut pollution abroad. For example, before the United States 
finally dropped its crude oil export ban, the United States Energy Information Ad-
ministration posted a briefing making the case that sending more U.S. oil to Mexico 
could, counterintuitively, lower pollution in Mexico.201 It argued that, due to the 
special characteristics of Mexican oil refineries, they would be able to produce more 
low sulfur gasoline if they were able to use light crude oil from the United States 
instead of heavy, sulfurous oil from Mexico.202 Again, the argument is plausible, but 
nearly any fossil fuel export can be justified if it is compared exclusively to a dirtier 
competitor.  
Thus, environmental reviews of energy transport projects are a recipe for en-
ergy trade conflict in two ways: they will result in regular government statements 
that the intent of the review process is to hamper energy markets abroad; and, they 
will encourage conflicting environmental analyses that will be used to justify and 
resist trade restrictions.203 In the end, the best view is the one stated in Executive 
Order 12114 and articulated by the State Department in its review of the original 
Keystone pipeline: U.S. environmental reviews should not cover energy production 
that is regulated by other countries.204  
Even when the energy transport project is designed to serve domestic, rather 
than global, energy markets, expanded reviews inevitably produce interjurisdictional 
tensions. Take the example of the Dakota Access pipeline. Historically, states have 
                                                   
http://ieefa.org/china-delivers-global-record-win-and-solar-installs-while-national-con-
sumption-drops-3-7-percent-in-2015/ [https://perma.cc/3KWW-H9JN].  
200 TIMOTHY J. SKONE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, LIFE CYCLE GREENHOUSE GAS 
PERSPECTIVE ON EXPORTING LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS FROM THE UNITED STATES 1 (2014), 
https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/05/f16/Life%20Cycle%20GHG%20Perspective% 
20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/RYN2-7CE3].  
201 U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Crude Oil Swaps with Mexico Could Provide Economic 
and Environmental Benefits, EIA.GOV (Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.eia.gov/to-
dayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=22872 [https://perma.cc/3KMU-CBXW].  
202 Id.  
203 Cliff L. Rothenstein & Stephen A. Martinko, Conflicting Priorities Could Slow En-
vironmental Reviews, LAW360 (Jan. 4, 2016), https://www.law360.com/arti-
cles/741036/conflicting-priorities-could-slow-environmental-reviews [https://perma.cc/NJ 
4K-E34L]. 
204 Exec. Order No. 12114, 44 Fed. Reg. 1957 (Jan. 4, 1979) (limiting environmental 
review of U.S. exports used abroad to consideration of “a product, or physical project pro-
ducing a principal product or an emission or effluent, which is prohibited or strictly regulated 
by Federal law in the United States because its toxic effects on the environment create a 
serious public health risk”); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 3, at 54 (“Possible impacts of 
the construction or operation of the Keystone Pipeline in Canada are properly the subject of 
review by appropriate Canadian governmental entities.”). 
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borne responsibility for oil pipeline siting.205 If the Army Corps had stuck by its 
December 2016 decision to perform a full federal environmental review of a domes-
tic pipeline, it would have fundamentally altered the balance of power in oil transport 
federalism.206 States naturally would have objected to a federal takeover of their long 
standing authority to decide questions of oil pipeline siting. Thus, expanded envi-
ronmental reviews of energy transport projects are just as likely to provoke domes-
tic, as well as international, jurisdictional conflict. 
 
V.  CLARIFYING THE SCOPE OF ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW OF ENERGY TRANSPORT 
 
Courts and agencies should make plain that the upstream and downstream im-
pacts of energy transport projects generally need not be assessed in NEPA reviews. 
Recall that the Supreme Court has said that agencies should consider indirect effects 
                                                   
205 Klass & Meinhardt, supra note 73, at 982–88, 1027–53 (noting varied approaches 
to oil pipeline siting in different states and collecting state statutes).   
206 Memorandum from Jo-Ellen Darcy, supra note 83, at 3–4. A more limited reading 
of this memorandum could argue that, rather than announcing more federal review of all 
pipelines, it was merely intended for the specific situation in which “totality of the circum-
stances in this case” included “the involvement of historic tribal homelands, the close prox-
imity to reservation lands . . . and potential impacts on treaty hunting and fishing rights.” Id. 
at 4.  But that was not how the decision was presented by the federal government or environ-
mental groups. Press Release, Joint Statement from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, the Dep’t of 
the Army, and the Department of the Interior Regarding Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Eng’rs (Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/joint-statement-de-
partment-justice-department-army-and-department-interior-regarding-standing [https:// 
perma.cc/9YBU-ZLGB] (“Furthermore this case has highlighted the need for a serious dis-
cussion on whether there should be nationwide reform with respect to considering tribes’ 
views on these types of infrastructure projects.”); The Standing Rock Sioux Tribe’s Litigation 
on the Dakota Access Pipeline: Updates and Frequently Asked Questions, EARTHJUSTICE, 
http://earthjustice.org/features/faq-standing-rock-litigation [https://perma.cc/A29C-GPME] 
(last updated Sept. 9, 2016) (interpreting the government’s joint statement as “call[ing] for a 
national review of the government’s approach to Tribal consultation for major fossil fuel 
projects”).  
In January 2017, just before the end of the Obama administration, the three departments 
issued a report on their review of consultation with tribes on infrastructure decisions. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, DEP’T OF THE ARMY & THE DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, IMPROVING TRIBAL CON-
SULTATION AND TRIBAL INVOLVEMENT IN FEDERAL INFRASTRUCTURE DECISIONS 2–5 
(2017), https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/as-ia/pdf/idc2-060030.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6VGY-S7TU]. The tribes’ recommendations focused mostly on oil pipe-
lines rather than infrastructure in general. See, e.g., id. at 15 (“Clarify the need to conduct an 
EIS for crude oil pipeline construction and operation.”); id. at 52 (“Tribes noted that the most 
problematic projects reviewed under the NHPA involve extractive industries (such as oil, 
natural gas and mining).”); id. at 65 (“Tribes similarly opposed the use of Nationwide Per-
mits to authorize major infrastructure projects (particularly oil pipelines), which Tribes did 
not believe sufficiently safeguarded treaty rights.”). The government departments, however, 
did not distinguish between different kinds of infrastructure projects. Id. at 16–24.  
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of an action when (a) that consideration would be “useful[] . . . to the decisionmak-
ing process”207 and (b) the agency action is the “proximate cause” of those effects, 
meaning that the agency bears legal responsibility for those actions or, as a matter 
of policy, should.208  
First, expanded reviews simply do not provide useful information to the deci-
sionmaking process.209 Even when regulators use state of the art models to estimate 
how new energy transport projects will affect energy production and consumption, 
they are unable to reach any useful conclusions: the results manage to be both too 
inconclusive to inform a decision and too precise to be plausible.210 The end point 
of the State Department’s seven years of review was that the Keystone XL pipeline 
would (a) slightly lower greenhouse gas emissions if the price of oil was over $75 
per barrel, but (b) massively increase greenhouse gas emissions if the price was be-
tween $65 and $75 per barrel.211 Thus, the State Department could not even say 
whether (or by how much) the pipeline would increase or decrease greenhouse gas 
emissions or oil production, but it could project that everything depended on whether 
oil sold for $75.01 or $74.99 per barrel.212 
Furthermore, energy projects move on a timeline unsuited for the kind of 
lengthy reviews required to estimate upstream and downstream emissions. The pro-
cedure that is used to consider the upstream and downstream impacts of a source of 
energy is known as “life cycle” modeling, because it attempts to assess the impact 
of the fuel that is transported across its full life cycle, from extraction, through 
transport, to combustion by an end user.213 In other words, this procedure attempts 
to measure how much greenhouse gas is emitted by producing, transporting, and 
burning each gallon of fuel.214  
This new tool, developed by scientists to study the impact of different energy 
sources, is increasingly used around the world, but relies on uncertain and contesta-
ble estimates that frequently result in controversial conclusions.215 It was developed 
                                                   
207 Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 767 (2004).  
208 Id. (quoting W. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS 264, 274–
75 (5th ed. 1984)). 
209 Welcome to the Future Energy Series, ADVISIAN, http://www.advisian.com/newen-
ergyfuture#chapters [https://perma.cc/M96J-U9UN] (last visited Aug. 5, 2017).  
210 Id.   
211 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 9, at 11.  
212 And, of course, by the time that the State Department’s review was complete, oil 
sold for $44 per barrel, far outside the range considered in the State Department study. See 
U.S. Energy Info. Admin., supra note 109 (showing that the price of oil in November 2015—
when the State Department reached its decision—was $44 per barrel). 
213 Coleman et al., supra note 126, at 1 (explaining how life cycle assessments are cal-
culated and employed as “a quantitative tool used to estimate the environmental burdens 
from a product or process over its entire life cycle from materials extraction to waste dis-
posal”).  
214 Id. 
215 Coleman & Jordaan, supra note 128, at 3 (“This tool is increasingly employed by 
regulators around the world, but, as with any model, it relies on uncertain estimates and 
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to answer general questions such as: when you consider farm emissions, is ethanol 
really cleaner than gasoline?216 Or, when you consider the pollution to produce 
power, are electric cars really cleaner than gasoline?217  
But now federal regulators are being asked to apply this procedure, which is 
designed to answer questions about fuels in general—with difficulty—and apply it 
to questions about the global impact of a single pipeline, port facility, or energy 
transport project.218 No wonder then, that the State Department’s attempts to accom-
plish this were time consuming and fraught with controversy.219 The problem is that 
energy markets will not wait for regulators to perfect their methodologies, so by the 
time the State Department completed its extensive analysis of the different effects 
of the Keystone pipeline given oil at $74 or $76 per barrel, oil was trading at $44.220 
Thus, the chance that the federal government could develop a new methodology for 
measuring these emissions, respond to public and interagency criticisms of that 
methodology, and reach a useful conclusion about the results in timely fashion is 
virtually nil. 
The “proximate cause analysis” analogue that the Supreme Court employs for 
cabining environmental assessment, confirms that it would be unwise to expand en-
ergy transport reviews to include a climate test.221 That analysis “turns on policy 
considerations and considerations of ‘legal responsibility’ of actors.”222 Given the 
unlikelihood of producing useful information and the danger of collateral impact for 
international energy trade, it is hard to see how policy considerations could favor 
expanded review. And the “legal responsibility” prong may be the key to assessing 
the proper scope of NEPA reviews for energy projects: unless the upstream or down-
stream effects are the legal responsibility of the agency making a decision on an 
energy transport project, they likely should not be considered. For example, federal 
regulators should not use energy transport decisions to try and regulate energy pro-
duction decisions that are the legal responsibility of other countries or of individual 
states. This rule would avoid the appearance of agency aggrandizement and, more 
                                                   
assumptions.”); Coleman, supra note 62, at 1393–94 (noting controversial life cycle studies, 
including one that suggested that, when one considers land use, wind power leads to more 
greenhouse gas emissions than fossil fuels). 
216 Coleman & Jordaan, supra note 128, at 3.  
217 Id. 
218 U.S. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm., Order Granting Abandonment and Issuing Certifi-
cates, 158 FERC ¶ 61,145 (Feb. 3, 2017), Separate Statement of Comm’r. Bay at *5 (“[T]he 
Commission should also be open to analyzing the downstream impacts of the use of natural 
gas and to performing a life-cycle greenhouse gas emissions study.”). 
219 Coleman and Jordaan, supra note 128, at 1–7. 
220 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 9, at 11. And note that these decisions are meant 
to summarize the market impacts of energy transport projects over decades to come—dec-
ades during which energy markets will continue to shift unpredictably. 
221 Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 767 (2004) (quoting W. KEETON ET 
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS 264, 274–75 (5th ed. 1984)). 
222 Id.  
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importantly, would eliminate the danger of environmental reviews provoking battles 
over international trade or federalism. 
So when, if ever, should environmental reviews consider the upstream and 
downstream impacts of an energy transport project? The Supreme Court’s two prin-
ciples should, again, be a guide: federal agencies should only include consideration 
of upstream and downstream emissions in the rare case when (a) those impacts can 
be estimated with sufficient certainty that they provide useful information for the 
federal decisionmaker, and (b) the federal decisionmaker has authority over those 
impacts.223 
For example, imagine that a company has proposed a short new road that will 
take coal from otherwise isolated federal lands that cannot otherwise be reached. 
That coal has no other path to market, so it will not be extracted unless the Bureau 
of Land Management approves both the proposed road and the coal mining.224 In 
such circumstances, the Bureau of Land Management’s review of the road should 
include a review of the coal mine that will only be viable because of the road. The 
capacity of the road may give useful information about the rate of coal extraction 
and the Bureau is not infringing on any other agency or sovereign’s authority to 
regulate coal mining on the property. So it would be appropriate to consider the 
upstream coal mine. On the other hand, even in this case, it would be useless and 
unwise to consider downstream consumption of coal, because once the coal is re-
moved, it will disperse through national and international energy markets. In a case 
like this, environmental assessment should be, and likely would be, coordinated be-
tween the production and transport project—between the mine and the road—so that 
the road review is not an opportunity to relitigate an approval for the mine project. 
The possibility of coordinated environmental reviews suggests another situa-
tion in which energy transport reviews could be coordinated with reviews of up-
stream or downstream production: agencies could coordinate their environmental 
reviews with the other agencies responsible for upstream or downstream decisions. 
For example, if a port authority on an island like Puerto Rico was considering a new 
terminal for oil import for power production, it could coordinate its environmental 
review with its utility regulator. In such an isolated market it might be possible to 
determine the downstream impact of the facility on oil power production on the is-
land.  
Apart from such exceptional circumstances, however, environmental assess-
ments of energy transport projects do not provide helpful information to regulators, 
and needlessly delay new infrastructure while straining international relations. As 
the Keystone XL environmental impact statement makes clear, even if an agency 
devotes substantial time and expertise to such an assessment, it is very unlikely to 
produce helpful results. Predicting the impact of a single transport project requires 
                                                   
223 Id. 
224 See Natural Gas Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-688, 52 Stat. 821 (1938) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 717 (2012)). 
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too many assumptions and estimations to produce reliable results or constrain a reg-
ulator seeking a predetermined outcome. Thus, it fails to serve the principal goals of 
environmental assessment law: neither providing useful information to the public 
nor improving the quality of regulator’s decisionmaking.225 
On the other hand, there may be benefits in wider reviews of energy infrastruc-
ture, in general, rather than specific energy transport projects. For instance, if an 
agency like FERC did a careful study of what level of fossil fuel pipeline infrastruc-
ture buildout would likely be built if the country adopted an optimal carbon tax, or 
if the nation met its current greenhouse gas reduction goals, that study could be a 
relevant consideration in pipeline and transmission approvals.226 Giving due credit 
to the distributed knowledge reflected by markets,227 if the pipeline buildout was 
faster than anticipated, that could signal either that (1) the previous studies, like so 
many energy studies, had failed to predict market developments; (2) new pipelines 
should not be approved; or that (3) the country was not willing to abide by the strict 
limits reflected in theoretical commitments to price carbon or reduce emissions.228 
Thus, these studies, unlike assessments of individual infrastructure, would be able 
to provide useful information because they would take advantage of existing lifecy-
cle analysis’s focus on large scale markets where more information may be a public 
good because of its wide benefits, rather than the project level decisions that are 
better studied by individual companies with money on the line.229 Again, these stud-
ies would likely not be a determinative factor in any review: inconsistencies between 
the study and infrastructure investment would be more likely to result from the 
study’s necessary generality and forward looking nature.230 But, over time, they 
could be calibrated to improve the country’s energy transport infrastructure forecast-
ing.231 In the meantime, such unprecedented and experiment reviews should not hold 
up energy investment.  
  
                                                   
225 A. Dan Tarlock, Is There a There There in Environmental Law?, 19 J. LAND USE & 
ENVTL. L. 213, 253 (2004). 
226 The Pipeline Link to Climate Change (and What’s Being Done About It), ABOUT 
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nities, 11 ORG. SCI. 448, 448–49, 467 (2000). 
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229 At the moment, there is little reason to think that pipeline companies build projects 
that would not have been viable in a world where carbon was priced. After all, fossil fuel 
companies are more likely than any broad category of industry to make decisions based on 
the assumption that carbon will be priced in the future. See Letter from ExxonMobil on En-
ergy & Carbon: Managing the Risks, to shareholders 16–18 (planning for carbon prices rang-
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CONCLUSION: GETTING BEYOND THE PIPELINE WARS 
 
The coming decades will determine the course of several energy transfor-
mations: new global markets in oil and gas serving growing demand centers in the 
developing world, new national markets in electricity bringing renewable power to 
urban demand centers, and new low carbon power sources driving a modern energy 
grid. Each of these transformations requires a massive buildout of new infrastructure 
and increased cooperation between regulators in competing jurisdictions. To navi-
gate these transformations, the United States needs to ensure that its environmental 
assessment law does not throw up roadblocks to new energy transport facilities and 
to energy diplomacy. As the Keystone XL saga shows, shoehorning a review of 
global energy markets into already complex environmental assessments would not 
provide environmental benefits but would endanger energy diplomacy. Congress 
and the courts should ensure that environmental assessments stay within their ap-
propriate scope. 
